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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature offers several approaches to 
understanding the nature of affect. Arnold (1970) perceived 
theories on affect to be divided into the four categories of 
1.) Biological theories; 2.) Physiological theories; 3.) 
Cognitive theories; and 4.) Psychological theories. Lazarus, 
Averill, and Opton (1970) classified theories of emotion 
into the three perspectives of biological, cultural, and 
cognitive. According to Lazarus et al. the biological 
perspective aligns emotions with the most "primitive", 
"animal-like", or instinctual of psychological phenomena. 
The biological perspective of emotion examines "the 
evolutionary significance or the adaptive value of behavior 
patterns associated with emotions" (Lazarus et al., 1970, 
p.214). Such theorists as Lindsley (1950), Bard (1950), and 
Maclean (1960) have associated emotions to more "primitive 
structures" (Lazarus et al., 1970) . Lazarus and his 
associates defined the cultural perspective of emotion as: 
The emotions are deeply rooted in man's 
cultural as well as his biological heritage. 
Viable social systems exist under the most 
diverse political and economic ideologies ... but no 
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social system can long survive once it fails to provide 
for the emotional needs of its citizens (cf. Hebb and 
Thompson, 1954), or fails to control or channel those 
emotions in ways tolerable to or advantageous for the 
social system. (p. 215) 
Perhaps present day examples of this include the rapid 
changes in the structure of Eastern European countries and 
the former Soviet Union. The complex interaction between 
society and emotions has been strongly emphasized by the 
major conflict theorist of personality, especially the 
Freudians and the Nee-Freudians (Maddi, 1989). 
The cognitive perspective on affect advocates that 
emotions are a function of cognition (Lazarus et al., 1970). 
These authors stated that~ 
the person or infra-human animal must be 
regarded as an evaluating organism, one who 
searches his en,vironment for cues about 
what he needs and wants,and evaluates each 
stimulus as to its personal relevance and 
significance. Emotions should be regarded 
as a function of such cognitive activity, 
each particular emotion presumably 
associated with a different evaluation. 
Biological and cultural determinants of 
emotion, as well as the individual's own 
past history and psychological structure, 
2 
can operate only through his immediate 
perception of objects and their 
significance for him. (p. 217) 
The cognitive perspective of affect has enjoyed a 
prominent position in the understanding the nature of affect 
from Schatcher and Singer's (1962) classic experiment to a 
reformulated learned helplessness theory of attribution 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Miller & Norman, 
197 9) . 
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Understanding the nature of affect is not only 
theoretically pertinent, but it also has practical 
implications in the field of psychology. With few 
exceptions, most psychotherapies employ the concept of 
emotions. Additionally, two major categories of 
classification of diagnoses in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual focus on mood and anxiety disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association [APAJ,1987). Depression is reported 
as a major mental health problem in the United States 
(Ponterotto, Pace, & Kavan, 1989). Emotions are important in 
understanding the link between physical and mental health. 
This is evident in the fact that anger, aggression and 
hostility are important factors in the etiology of essential 
hypertension and coronary heart disease (Diamond, 1982). 
Therefore, understanding the nature of affect and emotion is 
vital to the work of the psychologist and other mental health 
professionals. 
There is a known relationship between affect and 
cognition based on numerous studies in the field; 
however,there are still questions to be examined concerning 
this relationship. One issue is concerned with the 
definitions and measurement of particular constructs. 
Affective dimensions such as depression, anger, and anxiety 
have often been examined in the literature; however, there 
seems to be confusion in the definitions of these constructs 
due to overlap among the constructs (Mook, Van Der Ploeg, & 
Kleijn, 1990). For example, Mook et al. recently examined 
the confusion between the constructs of anxiety and 
depression. A definition of an affective dimension relates 
mostly to the theoretical foundation that the definition is 
based upon. However, how can these different affective 
dimensions such as anger, anxiety, and depression be 
understood in relation to each other if each one is based 
upon a different theoretical foundation? In addition, 
assessment techniques for each of these affective dimensions 
are also based on the respective theoretical foundation. 
This leads to confusion and overlap of these affective 
constructs. It appears that is it necessary to pinpoint a 
common element within all of these affective dimensions. 
Attributional or explanatory style may act as that common 
element. 
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How does explanatory or attributional style play a role 
in understanding affective dimensions? Strube (1985) stated, 
"the importance of attributional styles has been demonstrated 
primarily by research conducted within the learned 
helplessness paradigm" (p. 500). According to the vast 
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wealth of literature on depression and attributional style, 
there appears to be some relationship between attribution and 
depression. One might ask, if attribution relates well to 
depression, how might it relate to other affective constructs 
such as anger and anxiety? In the past, research has been 
done exploring the relationship between other affective 
dimensions and cognition (Lazarus et al., 1970; Schatcher & 
Singer, 1962). Studies employing the measures of 
attributional style, the Attributional Style Questionnaire or 
the Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire, to understand 
the nature of emotions other than depression are few in 
number. This may be due to the fact that both measures were 
recently developed within the past eight years. However, one 
might wonder why have the other affective dimensions have not 
received as much attention in the literature in relation to 
attributional style? 
The following study undertook the task of 
examining the relationship of attribution to affective 
dimensions. How does explanatory style relate to the 
experience of affect? Is there a relationship between the 
experience of state/trait affect and attributional style? 
Does gender play a role in the relationship between affect 
and cognition? 
First, attribution and attributional style will be 
examined. Next an understanding of different theoretical 
conceptualizations of the affective dimensions of depression, 
anger, and anxiety will be explored. In addition, issues 
concerning the assessment of these constructs will be 
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discussed. Finally, a survey of the literature examining the 
relationship between attribution and these affective 
dimensions will be provided. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIBW 
Attribution Theory 
Shaw and Costanzo (1982) proposed that "attribution 
theory is typically concerned with the processes and schema 
invoked by the perceiver in assigning causes to these events" 
(p. 233). They added that through these causal analyses "the 
perceiver arrives at inferences about the disposition of 
other persons and himself/herself, as well as inference about 
the stability of environmental entities" (Shaw & Costanzo, 
1982, p. 232). Two major theorists responsible for the 
formulation of attribution in its beginning stages are Fritz 
Heider and Harold H. Kelley. 
Fritz Heider 
The theory of attribution began with the ideas and 
concepts of Fritz Heider. When asked about the origins of 
his ideas concerning the beginning of attribution theory, 
Fritz Heider returned to the puzzle he was to solve offered 
to him by the philosopher Meinong (Heider, 1980a, p. 3). 
The puzzle was the following: 
When the sun shines on a house and the light reflected 
by our eye, why do we say that we see the house? Since 
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light is caused by the sun, why don't we say that we 
see the sun?. (Heider, 1980a, p. 3) 
Heider (1980a) offered in answering such a puzzle, that 
an individual will turn his/her attention to the perception 
of the outside world and the conditions of perception. 
8 
Heider suggested, "the parts of the environment have 
differing degrees of causal importance - a kind of causal 
hierarchy exists» (p. 4). Heider proposed that because a 
causal hierarchy exists, it "allows our perception to extend 
beyond the limits of our bodies and allows us to learn 
something about the larger environment" (Heider,1980, p.4). 
Heider added, "it also makes it possible for us 'to 
attribute' (zuschreiben) events and contents, that is to 
relate them to other events and contents" (p. 4). In 
examining people's roles in the perception of events, Heider 
offered, "persons are to a far greater extent than things the 
originators of events; they are the ones who direct changes 
and usually determine the occurrence of events" (p. 5). In 
defining attribution in terms of perception, Heider stated, 
"attribution is a relative of perception; it serves to anchor 
our impressions and the perceived changes in the conception 
of the more invariant sphere of relevant entities" (1980 b, 
p. 18). Heider also offered, ilattribution often means a unit 
formation of belonging together between an event and a 
person" (1980 b, p. 18). Heider offered two general 
propositions in defining attribution. The first proposition 
is "interpersonal relations are primarily a function of 
people's interpretations of the actions of others in the 
social field" (Shaw & Costanzo, 1982, p. 233). The second 
proposition offered by Heider is: 
motivations underlying attributional processes inherent 
in people's strong needs to seek understanding of the 
transient events that they observe by attributing 
them to enduring dispositional properties of the 
actor/and or to the stable and invariant properties of 
the environment giving rise to the events. (Shaw & 
Costanzo, 1982, p. 233) 
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In examining attribution, Heider also suggested, "the 
adaptive significance of the individual's search for 
invariance in both social others and environmental entities 
is that such invariance allows for both the understanding of 
current events and people and the prediction of future events 
and personal activities" (Shaw & Costanzo, 1982, p. 233). 
Thus Heider gave the elements of understanding and 
predictability to attribution. 
Harold H. Kelley 
Harold H. Kelley is another important figure in the 
development of attribution theory. Kelley developed the 
theory of external attribution that "focuses upon those 
conditions which lead a perceiver to attribute cause to an 
environmental entity with which an actor or group of actors 
interacts." (Shaw & Costanzo, 1982, p. 241). Kelley's 
external attribution theory is composed of the two concepts 
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of causal schemata and causal principles which provide 
structure and order to the making of attributions. In the 
concept of causal schemata, Kelley offered two types: 
multiple sufficient causal {MSC) schemata and multiple 
necessary causal (MNC) schemata. The idea of multiple 
sufficient causal schemata "suggests that when there are two 
or more causes for a particular observed effect, knowledge of 
the presence of one of the causes reduces the plausibility 
that the other cause(s) is also present" (Shaw & Costanzo, 
1982, p. 245-246). Multiple necessary causal schemata 
represents the idea that the Hpreserice of one cause does IlQ:t. 
imply the absence of another plausible cause" (Shaw & 
Costanzo, 1982, p. 246). Kelley (1972) added that multiple 
necessary causal schemata does not apply as well to cases 
where effects are present versus when they are absent. 
Kelley's concept of causal principles offered a shorthand of 
sorts that allows a person to "sort" between causes of events 
in order to choose the most plausible one (Shaw & Costanzo, 
1982). Three important causal principles developed by Kelley 
are the covariation principle, the discounting principle, and 
the augmentation principle. The covariation principle 
stated, "when there are two or more plausible causes for an 
effect, the one that the effect is consistently contingent 
with across time will be seen as the stronger cause" (Shaw & 
Costanzo, 1982, p. 247). The covariation principle allowed 
one to make attributions without other criteria. Kelley 
stated it another way in that "an effect is attributed to one 
of its possible causes with which, over time, it covaries" 
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(Kelley, 1971, p. 3). Kelley (1971) suggested the 
discounting principle occurred when "the role of a given 
cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other 
plausible causes are also present" (p. 8). The discounting 
principle is more likely to be used when an event is observed 
and one or more of the sufficient causes is known by the 
perceiver (Shaw & Costanzo, 1982). The augmentation 
principle proposed "if for a given effect, both a plausible 
inhibitory and a plausible facilitative cause are present, 
the role of the facilitative cause will be judged greater 
than if it alone were presented as a plausible cause of the 
effect" (Kelley, 1971, p. 12). Kelley (1980) discussed the 
management of causal attributions through the use of an 
~nalogy of a magic trick. Kelley stated, "the successful 
magic trick intimately involves the causal attribution 
process" (1980, p. 19). Kelley proposed that magic tricks 
are always an interactive, interpersonal event between the 
magician and the effect he/she wishes to make on the 
audience. Kelley proposed the magician's success is due to 
the fact that "magicians may have an implicit understanding 
of the attribution process that in some ways is superior to 
that of their audience"(1980, p. 20). 
It appears that attribution may be necessary for 
understanding human experience in general, and specifically 
affect or emotions. How might the cognitive explanatory 
component of attribution play a role in understanding affect? 
Prior to considering this question thoroughly, the constructs 
of affect will be examined. 
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Depression 
An Overview 
Several sources report that depression may be one of the 
most common psychological disorders reported (Abramson & 
Martin, 1981). In addition, depression continues to be a 
major mental health problem in the United States (Ponterotto 
et al., 1989). Studies of incidence rates indicate that 4.5% 
to 9.3% of adult females and 2.3% to 3.2% of adult males 
suffer from depression at any given time (APA, 1987). 
Depression is reported to be the most prevalent major mental 
health problem, and it is the most frequently given diagnosis 
associated with psychiatric hospitalization (Dean, 1985). 
Definitions of Depression 
Clinical Definitign 
What may be defined as depression? According to the 
Diagngstic and Statistical Manual Qf Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition - Revised [DSM III - R} (APA, 1987), depression may 
fall into categories ranging from an adjustment disorder to a 
bipolar disorder with depressed mood. Central to these 
diagnosis is the classification of a major depressive 
episode. The central feature of a major depressive episode 
is "either depressed mood (or possibly, in children or 
adolescents, an irritable mood) or loss of interest or 
pleasure in all, or almost all, activities, and associated 
symptoms, for a period of at least two weeks" (APA, 1987, p. 
218). The associated symptoms of a major depressive episode 
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include "appetite disturbance, change in weight, sleep 
disturbance, psychomotor agitation or retardation, decreased 
energy, feelings of worthlessness or excessive or 
inappropriate guilt, difficulty in thinking or 
concentrating, and recurrent thoughts of death, or 
suicidal ideation or attempts" (APA, 1987, p. 219). 
Diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode require 
that at least five of the associated symptoms are present 
during a two week period, represent a change from previous 
functioning, have no basis in an organic factor or as a 
reaction to the death of a loved one (uncomplicated 
bereavement), no evidence of hallucinations or delusions 
before or after the symptoms occurred or remitted, and not 
superimposed on Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, 
Delusional Disorder, or Psychotic Disorder NOS (APA, 1987). 
Cognitive Approach To Depression 
There appears to be a shift in understanding depression 
from a motivational-affective view to a more cognitive 
approach (Abramson & Martin, 1981). This is evident in the 
rise of cognitive therapies created by Beck, Ellis, and 
Glasser, to name a few (Belkin, 1987). Specifically, Beck's 
cognitive model of depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979), the model of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975), 
the reformulated model of learned helplessness and depression 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) underlined, "the 
significance of maladaptive causal inference processes in the 
etiology and maintenance of depression" ( Abramson & Martin, 
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1981, p. 71). These three models will now be examined . 
.B.e.c.k. Beck (1967) viewed depression as a syndrome made 
up of five categories of symptoms: affective, cognitive, 
motivational-behavioral; self esteem, and vegetative. The 
affective symptom is comprised of feelings of sadness or 
unhappiness. The motivational-behavioral symptom is 
comprised of "retarded initiation of voluntary responses and 
is reflected in passivity, intellectual slowness, and social 
impairment" (Abramson & Martin, 1981, p. 118). The "loss of 
self-esteem'; symptom may be reflected in feelings of guilt 
and low self regard (Beck, 1967). The cognitive aspect of 
depression "consists of a 'negative cognitive set' that 
biases depressives to believe that their actions are doomed 
to failure" (Abramson & Martin, 1981, p. 118). Beck (1967) 
stated that no specific depressive symptom is necessary or 
sufficient to make a diagnosis of clinical depression. 
Though Beck listed several symptoms of depression, his theory 
relies more on the cognitive aspect. The basic idea 
underlying Beck's cognitive therapy is "the individual's 
primary problem has to do with his construction of reality" 
(Beck, 1985, p. 328). Beck believed that an individual's 
problems may be created from particular distortions of 
reality based on false assumptions and premises (Ritter, 
1985). Based on this idea, specific emotions are caused by 
particular interpretations of reality, thus one's emotions 
will be consistent with the distortion of reality and not 
reality itself (Ritter, 1985). The goal of Beck's cognitive 
therapy is "to help a person unravel his or her distortions 
15 
in thinking and learn more realistic ways to formulate 
cognitive experiences" (Ritter, 1985, p. 42). In his work 
with depression, Beck developed the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) that offers a standardized means of evaluating a 
client's depression (Belkin, 1987). 
The Model of Learned Helplessness. Another 
conceptualization of depression is the learned helplessness 
model of depression. Abramson and Martin (1981) stated that 
many "clinicians and experimental psychologists have 
emphasized the role of helplessness and hopelessness in 
depression" (p. 119). Seligman presented a theory of 
helplessness in depression after observing and emphasizing 
similarities between changes in behavior elicited in humans 
and animal laboratory subjects after being exposed to 
aversive, uncontrollable events and the symptoms associated 
with human depression. Thus the concept of learned 
helplessness was described first by animal learning theorists 
at the University of Pennsylvania (Peterson,1982). Seligman 
and his associates found that while dogs were given 
inescapable shocks while being immobilized, twenty four hours 
later showed a marked impairment characterized by a failure 
to initiate escape responses (motivational deficit), an 
inability to employ an ocassionally successful escape 
response (cognitive or associative deficit), and a passive 
acceptance of the shock (emotional deficit) (Peterson, 1982). 
(See Maier and Seligman, 1976, for a review of learned 
helplessness experiments with animals). 
According to the learned helplessness theory (Abramson, 
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Garber, and Seligman, 1980), learning that outcomes are 
uncontrollable leads to three deficits: motivational, 
cognitive, and emotional. The motivational deficit may be 
described as retardation in the initiation of voluntary 
responses. The cognitive deficit is seen as difficulty in 
learning that responses affect outcomes. The emotional 
deficit consists of depressed affect. In describing this 
phenomenon, Seligman and his associates used the label of 
learned helplessness. They proposed that during the exposure 
to the inescapable shocks, the dogs thought that their 
responses and outcomes (i.e. the shocks) were not related to 
each other (Peterson, 1982). In other terms, Abramson and 
Martin stated, "according to the learned helplessness model 
of depression, the expectation that one's responses do not 
control important outcomes is sufficient to produce the 
motivational-behavioral and cognitive symptoms of depression" 
(p. 120). Therefore, learned helplessness theory is 
primarily cognitively oriented. The theory stated cognitions 
(beliefs) are essential for the occurrence of learned 
helplessness. Instead of predicting that exposure to 
uncontrollable outcomes will lend to helplessness, the 
organism must expect that outcomes are uncontrollable for the 
behavioral deficits to occur. 
Soon after learned helplessness was observed in 
laboratory animals, many researchers attempted to elicit the 
same response with human subjects (Peterson, 1982). After 
several early attempts failed to replicate learned 
helplessness (Wortman & Brehm, 1975), a number of 
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researchers, including Seligman, reported explicit 
demonstrations of the phenomenon in the literature (Peterson, 
1982). Soon after these demonstrations, there were many 
attempts at applying the concept of learned helplessness in 
clinical settings (Peterson, 1982). In addition several 
studies were done in order to critique the theory of learned 
helplessness. Peterson summarized some of the suggested 
problems with the concept, and he stated, "in short, the 
simple explanation of the observed helplessness effects (e.g. 
uncontrollable events - expectation of responses - outcome 
independence - interference with objectively possible 
learning) seemed to fail to do justice to the complexity of 
human helplessness'; (p. 99) . Peterson stated that most 
critics of the learned helplessness model, as applied to 
human beings, lacks in sophistication, and he added that most 
critics believed that an attributional account of 
helplessness would correct that fault. 
Reform:t,;1lated Learned Helplessness Theory. Due to the 
complexity of human helplessness, it became apparent that the 
basic learned helplessness theory developed out of animal 
research was too simplistic to be strictly applied to humans. 
Out of the critiques of learned helplessness and a rising 
interest in attribution theory and its applications, came a 
reformulation of the theory of learned helplessness. 
Abramson and his associates introduced the reformulation of 
learned helplessness based on Seligman's earlier theory 
(Weiner, 1986). The theory perceived helplessness as "a 
consequence of perceptions of a noncontingency between one's 
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responses and desired outcomes." (Weiner, 1986, p. 217). 
Specifically, if the probability of a desired outcome is 
perceived as not being increased by one's actions, then 
helplessness will be the result (Weiner, 1986). A high 
expectancy of noncontingency (helplessness) was proposed to 
result in.a depression, a general syndrome made up of 
cognitive, motivational and behavior deficits (Weiner, 1986). 
The reformulated theory stated that when a person finds 
himself/ herself in a situation where the outcomes are 
perceived as uncontrollable, this helplessness 
(uncontrollability) is attributed to a cause. Abramson et 
al. offered that there are three attributional dimensions of 
causality relevant to human helplessness: stable/unstable, 
global/specific, and internal/external (Murphey, 1986). 
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) proposed, "when a 
person finds that he is helpless, he asks why he is 
helpless. The causal attribution he makes then determines the 
generality and chronicity of helplessness as well as his 
later self-esteem" (p. 50). Abramson et al. (1978) 
classified the attribution for a response-outcome 
noncontingency on three dimensions of causality: 
internal/external, stable/unstable, and global/specific. 
Abramson et al. (1978) used the dimension of locus of 
causality to differentiate personal from universal 
helplessness in that personal helplessness relates to an 
internal attribution for perceived noncontingency thus 
lowering self-esteem. On the other hand, universal 
helplessness "corresponds to an external perception of 
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causality and is based on the presumption that other persons 
in this situation also would not enhance their likelihood of 
goal attainment through personal responses'' (Weiner, 1986, p. 
218) Abramson et al. (1978) cited the example in which 
parents of children diagnosed with leukemia will often 
experience universal helplessness rather than personal. The 
importance of the distinction between personal versus 
universal helplessness is that Abramson et al. (1978) 
predicted that these two types of helplessness will make 
different impacts upon an individual's self-esteem. 
Situations that lead to evolution of personal helplessness 
are expected to result in a decrease in self-esteem. 
Situations that promote universal helplessness; however, are 
not predicted to have any effects on self-esteem. Abramson 
et al. added that both types, personal and universal, of 
perceived noncontingency would "result in passivity, negative 
beliefs about the future, and general negative effect" 
(Weiner, 1986, p. 218). 
It is important to note the difference between the 
causal attributions of internality/ externality and locus of 
control. As described by Levenson (1981), the construct of 
locus of control refers to an individual's generalized 
expectancy to view reinforcement either as contingent on 
his/her own behaviors (i.e., internal control) or as the 
result of forces beyond his/her control, thus due to chance 
or powers outside the individual (i.e., external control). 
It is clear that an individual's locus of control is composed 
of causal attributions, perhaps internal and external. Due 
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to the substantial overlap between the locus of control 
construct and Abramson et al.'s (1978) concept of 
personal/universal learned helplessness, one might expect 
locus of control to be related to vulnerability to self-
esteem loss. The locus of control construct has been 
examined in studies of learned helplessness (Sandler, Reese, 
Spencer, & Harpin, 1983); however, this construct has not 
been included in experimental research examining the 
personal/universal helplessness distinction (Murphey, 1986). 
The Stability dimension is concerned with the extent an 
individual believes that the factors that produce 
helplessness are either long lasting or short-lived. 
Stability is a determinant of the chronicity of helplessness 
deficits. Murphey (1986) stated: 
for example, a person who attributes 
his/her inability to solve a Rubik's Cube 
puzzle to difficulty concentrating because 
of a hangover (an unstable factor) is 
predicted to be less likely to show 
helplessness deficits in the future than a person who 
attributes his/her poor performance to difficulty of the 
puzzle (a stable factor). (p. 2) 
Thus Stability/Instability dimension of learned 
helplessness refers to the chronicity of helplessness for the 
more stable the attribution, the more chronic the 
helplessness. 
The global/specific dimensions of causal attributions 
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refers to the extent to which an individual believes that the 
cause of helplessness or uncontrollability are generalized 
across many situations or is limited to one or a few specific 
situations. The attributional dimension of 
Globality/specificity is proposed to determine the trans-
situational generality of helplessness deficits. For 
example: 
if a person attributed inability to solve a 
Rubik's Cube to poor three-dimensional 
visualization ability (a relatively 
specific factor), he/she would be predicted to 
show helplessness deficits only in 
situations in which this ability is 
important. On the other hand, if the poor 
performance were attributed to difficulty 
with logical reasoning (a relatively 
global factor), the helplessness deficits 
would be predicted to occur in a broader range of 
situations. (Murphey, 1986, p. 3) 
The causality dimensions of Stability and Globality will 
influence the expectancy of future noncontingency thus 
holding implications for the generality and chronicity of 
helplessness (Weiner, 1986). It is proposed, "the more 
stable and global the perceived cause of the noncontingency, 
the more likely it is that the noncontingency will be 
expected in the future, and the greater the variety of 
situational cues that also will elicit perceptions of 
noncontingency'' (Weiner, 1986, 218-219). 
Abramson et al. (1978) summarized their attributional 
approach to depression as follows: 
1. Depression consists of four classes of 
deficits:motivational, cognitive, self- esteem, and 
affective. 
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2. When highly desired outcomes are believed improbable 
or highly aversive outcomes are believed probable, and 
the individual expects that no response in his 
repertoire will change their likelihood, 
(helplessness) depression results. 
3. The generality of the depressive deficits will depend 
on the globality of the attribution for helplessness, 
the chronicity of the depression deficits will 
depend on the stability of the attribution 
for helplessness, and whether self-esteem 
is lowered will depend on the internality 
of the attribution for helplessness. (p. 68) 
In summary, the relationship of depression to 
attribution has been well documented. However, certain 
questions still arise. Is there a consistent pattern between 
the type of attributions made and the nature of depression? 
How do the different dimensions of attributions interact with 
depression? In addition, this relationship between 
attribution and depression is heavily dependent on the 
measures of these constructs. Issues in the measurement of 
depression are central to understanding and operationalizing 
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the constructs. 
Issues in the Measurement of Depression 
Several concerns are associated with the assessment of 
depression. According to Ponterotto, Pace, and Kavan (1989), 
"an assessment or diagnosis of depression is usually made 
using one of three procedures: (a) specific operational 
criteria and structured clinical/diagnostic interviews; 
(b) semistructured interviews and clinical rating scales; (c) 
client self-report instruments" (p.301). Most instruments 
used in research are in the form of client self-reports. A 
major consideration about the measurement of depression is 
that instruments such as the BDI attempt to measure 
depression as a undimensional concept while there is ample 
evidence that depression may be a multidimensional construct 
(Stoltz & Galassi, 1989). Stoltz and Galassi (1989) 
reexamined the reformulated learned helplessness model in 
terms of the internality/externality dimension of depression 
and self-esteem. Stoltz and Galassi argued that the role of 
internality in learned helplessness has never been fully 
explored. In addition, the authors proposed that other 
studies of depression and learned helplessness do not 
consider the two types of depression suggested by the 
reformulated learned helplessness model, one with low self-
esteem and one without low self-esteem. 
It appears that attributional style may enhance the 
understanding of the construct of depression. Perhaps, 
attributional style may influence the experience or form of 
24 
depression in the role of a mediator. Perhaps depression may 
be experienced and thus measured in terms of a 
characterlogical trait or situational state. It is proposed 
that the attributional constructs of Internality/Externality, 
Stability/Instability, and Globality/Specificity may 
determine whether depression is experienced in a state or 
trait mode. Though there is no "state-trait" depression scale 
out on the market as to date, it is an important concept to 
consider. Mook et al. (1990) addressed this issue in the 
following: 
In contrast to affective states, 
surprisingly few studies have specifically 
directed their attention to the measurement and 
relationship of anxiety, anger, and 
depression on the trait level. One reason 
for this relative dearth of studies at the 
trait level may be that research in 
depression has been predominantly concerned 
with depression as a clinical state (or syndrome). 
Consequently, most measures of depression have been 
intended to be measures of the degree of current 
depression, i.e. are state measures (Dobson, 1985). 
(p. 18) 
Perhaps the concept of attribution may help delineate 
state depression from trait depression. For example, 
individuals who experience depression in the form of a 
"trait" or characterlogical experience also tend to make 
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internal, global and stable attributions, while individuals 
who experience depression in the form of a ''state" or 
situational experience may make external, specific, and 
unstable attributions. It appears that the understanding and 
treatment of depression in terms of state or trait dimensions 
would profit from such an investigation. Clinically, though 
it is beneficial to diagnose the chronicity of depression 
with scales similar to the BDI, it would be of profound 
importance if the clinician could determine the difference 
between situational depression and characterlogical 
depression for the treatment and prognosis would vary based 
on the diagnosis. In terms of a research scale, a clearer 
understanding of depression would arise based on studies 
using a state/trait depression instrument as opposed to an 
undimensional measure. In order to examine a complex 
construct, more sophisticated assessments are needed. 
Anger 
Theoretical Perspectives on Anger 
Theoretical explanations of anger have not received the 
same attention as explanations of depression. The terms of 
anger, aggression, and hostility have been used 
interchangeably in the literature. Spielberger, Jacobs, 
Russell, and Crane (1983) defined the terms in the following 
ways. Anger is perceived as an elementary affective 
dimension that is associated with feeling states that vary 
from annoyance to rage. Hostility is defined as an 
attitudinal set that provides the motivation for aggressive 
behavior. Aggression is described as a punitive or 
destructive behavior that is directed towards other persons 
or objects. 
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Throughout the literature, there appears to be a 
confusion as to what is an appropriate definition of the 
construct of anger. According to Maiuro, Cahn, Vitaliano, 
Wagner, and Zegree (1988), anger has been defined as an 
emotional reaction (Buss, 1961; Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, 
& Crane, 1983) that "may be conceptually differentiated from 
behavioral acts of aggression, such distinctions are 
difficult to operationalize because aggression is commonly 
associated with anger in clinical and natural settings 
(Diamond, 1982)" (p. 17). Spielberger and his associates 
attempted to clarify these constructs through the use of the 
"AHA! Syndrome" (i.e. anger, hostility and aggression). 
Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, and Crane (1983) stated: 
The concept of anger usually refers to an emotional 
state that consists of feelings that vary in intensity, 
from mild irritation or annoyance to intense fury and 
rage. Although hostility usually involves angry 
feelings, this concept has the connotation of a complex 
set of attitudes that motivate aggressive behaviors 
directed toward destroying objects or injuring other 
people ... While anger and hostility refer to feelings 
and attitudes, the concept of aggression generally 
implies destructive or punitive behavior directed 
towards other persons or objects. (p .16) 
It is evident that definitions of anger vary in nature 
and scope. The physiological, psychoanalytic, and social 
learning theory perspectives on anger will be reviewed. 
Physiological Definitions of Anger 
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In physiology, anger and aggression are important 
concepts in that "almost all species of animals engage in 
aggressive behaviors, which involve threatening gestures or 
actual attack directed toward another animal" (Carlson, 1986, 
p. 480). Understanding the physiological basis of anger and 
aggression has been fruitful in understanding these 
constructs. Carlson (1986) categorized the five most 
important types of aggression as the following: 
1. Social Aggression - the attack of an individual 
animal on another member of the same species and can be 
stimulated by several means. 
2. Self-Defense - when an animal is attacked by another 
and fights back. 
3. Maternal Aggression - is displayed by a lactating 
mammal when disturbed near her nesting site or near her 
young. 
4. Infanticide - refers to the killing of very young 
animals by adults. 
5. Predatory Aggression - is different from all the 
others, and some investigators do not consider it to be 
a form of aggression. When a lion attacks a zebra ... 
the predator does not appear to be angry at its prey. 
(p.480) 
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In addition, Carlson (1986) stated that electrical 
stimulation of different regions of the brain may elicit 
three types of aggressive behavior: affective attack, 
predatory attack, and fear-induced attack. According to 
Carlson, "affective attack is dramatic and certainly 
indicates strong feelings" (p. 481). The image of a cat 
adopting a "Halloween Cat" posture with an arched back, erect 
fur on neck and back, dilated pupils, and bared teeth is a 
good example of affective attack (Carlson, 1986). Moyer 
(1976) set forth another classification scheme for aggression 
and anger. Moyer defined aggression as overt behavior, that 
is either direct or indirect, with the intent to inflict 
noxious stimulation or to act destructively toward another 
organism. On the other hand, Moyer described anger as "an 
aroused state involving particular autonomic and muscle tone 
patterns" in which "during anger the individual's threshold 
for aggression is lowered" (1976, p. 3). This definition of 
anger is similar to the "Fight or Flight" (Selye, 1936) 
arousal of an organism when faced with threat. 
The implications of a physiological understanding of 
anger and aggression suggest that anger and aggression in 
animals, as well as humans, is instinctive and adaptive for 
survival. Darwin suggested that the origins of all human 
emotions could be found in lower animals, and that emotional 
expression served the same adaptive purpose (Tavris, 1989). 
Darwin (1872) contended that rage is a simple response to 
threat, and that the animal is required to become aroused to 
defend itself. 
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Psychoanalytic Definition of Anger 
The psychoanalytic school of thought addresses anger 
from a different perspective. Freud perceived aggression as 
one of the basic life forces or instincts that acts within a 
hydraulic system in search of discharge (Hall, 1979). Freud 
believed that the libido was a finite source of energy that 
fueled one's internal battles. Sabini (1978) stated, 
"undischarged drives contribute their energy to the id, the 
reservoir of sexual and aggressive instincts ... when the level 
has reached a critical point, overt aggression results" 
(p. 344). Freud applied the concept of catharsis directly to 
aggression as an explanation as to why individuals, who were 
governed by violent instincts, were not attacking each other 
regularly. Catharsis was the mechanism that emptied the 
emotional reservoir (Tavris, 1989). Tavris argued that 
Freud's concept of the expression and management of 
aggression through repression, sublimation, and guilt was 
simplified and generalized in its use currently. She stated 
that many of Freud's successors labeled repression, 
sublimation, and guilt as negative, and that these concepts 
were to be done away with (Tavris, 1989). Bowlby (1973) 
explained that anger is a response to separation from a 
parent figure. In psychoanalysis, anger plays a special role 
in the form of transference and countertransference (Belkin, 
1987). Belkin stated, "one of the most powerful resistances 
is to the expression of hostile feelings toward the analyst" 
(p. 69). In order for therapy to be effective, the therapist 
must make use of the projected hostile feelings when working 
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with the client. It appears that the psychoanalytic 
perspective on aggression focused on these concepts as fixed 
and inevitable. Tavris (1989) wrote: 
.Although Freud, like Darwin, regarded aggression as an 
ineradicable part of the human biological heritage, 
Freud emphasized the destructive; violent aspect of 
aggression, whereas Darwin saw aggression as self-
defending and adaptive. Curiously, neither scientist 
paid much attention to anger. If they wrote about it at 
all, it was a subcategory or weaker expression of 
the basic aggressive drive. (p. 39) 
Social Learning Theory 
Another perspective of anger and aggression is provided 
by Social Learning theory. As opposed to the physiological 
and psychoanalytic perspectives that proposed that anger and 
aggression are innate, social learning theory stated that 
aggression is a learned phenomenon. Social Learning 
theorists such as Bandura (1973) suggest a social learning 
component to aggression and emotion in general. Bandura 
reported, "people are not born with preformed repertoires of 
aggression behavior ... they must learn them in one way or 
another" (1978, p. 31). Bandura (1978) defined aggression as 
"behavior that results in personal injury and in destruction 
of property" (p. 30). To support his theory, Bandura 
conducted several studies on aggression related to vicarious 
learning via models. 
Bandura (1978) proposed three main components to 
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social learning theory. The three components are the 
acquisition of aggressive behavior, the aggressive elicitors, 
and the reinforcers of aggression. In the acquisition of 
aggressive behavior, Bandura (1978) outlined three main modes 
of acquiring aggressive behavior through observational 
learning. Observational learning may develop from "three 
major sources of aggressive behavior - family influences, 
subcultural influences, and symbolic modeling" (1978, p. 34). 
Bandura believed that though an individual learned 
aggressive behavior through observation, he/she would not 
necessarily act on the learning unless the aggressive 
patterns are activated and channeled. Bandura (1973) wrote, 
"affective modeling cues can give definitions to emotional 
states of uncertain origin, or in ambiguous situations where 
people know the source of their arousal but are unsure how 
they are supposed to react to it" (p. 55). Aggressive 
elicitors may take different forms. Bandura (1978) stated, 
"people who are repeatedly exposed to combative models tend 
to be more physically assaultive in their social interactions 
than those who observe nonviolent styles of content" (p. 40). 
An example of this is that many children who are physically 
abused grow up to abuse themselves. !n addition, Bandura 
(1978) included other aggressive elicitors as aversive 
treatment, physical assaults, verbal threats and insults, 
thwarting of goal-directed behavior, instructional control, 
and delusional control. In order to sustain a pattern of 
aggressive behavior, Bandura (1978) proposed the reinforcers 
of aggression. Bandura (1978) wrote,"aggressive modes of 
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respon~e, like other forms of social behavior, can be 
induced, eliminated, and reinstated when the effects they 
produce are altered" (p. 47). Sources of reinforcement for 
aggressive behavior may be direct external reinforcement such 
as tangible, social and status rewards. Aggressive behavior 
may also be reinforced through the alleviation of aversive 
treatment. Bandura stated, "defensive forms of aggression 
are often reinforced by their capacity to terminate 
humiliating and painful treatment" (p.49). Patterson, 
Littman, and Bricker (1967) documented this concept in 
studies that show children who are victimized but terminate 
the maltreatment through successful counteraggression, will 
eventually become highly aggressive behaviorally. Other 
reinforcers of aggressive are vicarious and self 
reinforcement (Bandura, 1978). Vicarious reinforcement 
conveys information about the types of behaviors that are 
approved or disapproved of and the specific conditions these 
behaviors may be preformed under (Bandura, 1978). Self-
reinforcement of aggressive behaviors rests on the notion 
that humans can and do regulate their own actions (Bandura, 
1978). Bandura stated, "by engaging in self-absorbing 
practices~ humane and moral people can behave cruelly without 
self-condemnation" (1978, p. 54). Bandura (1978) proposed 
that the self-exoneration may take many forms. One tactic is 
to minimize one's aggressive behavior by comparing it to more 
outrageous conduct. Another technique is to justify 
aggression through euphemistic labeling, thus construing 
one's aggression in terms of higher powers. Other methods of 
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self-exoneration are displacement of responsibility, 
diffusion of responsibility, dehumanization of victims, 
attribution of blame to victims, misrepresentation of 
consequences, and graduated desensitization (Bandura, 1978). 
The implications of Bandura's theory suggest that 
aggression is a learned behavior based on an individual's 
perception of the act. Though Bandura addressed aggression 
in his work, the concept of anger is rarely mentioned. It is 
apparent that social learning theory concentrates on the 
aggression behavior, and not on the underlying emotion. 
It is interesting to note that as in depression, there 
is learned helplessness that is a learned perspective based 
on experiences and observations, that perhaps there is a 
corollary in the understanding of anger. Based on Bandura's 
notion that anger and the expression of it is determined 
through learning, perhaps it is a "learned aggressiveness" in 
which an individual makes a decision on how to act based on 
his/her attributions of the model or of their own behavior. 
Bandura's and the learned helplessness theorist may have a 
similar approach to understanding affect. 
As there are many different theoretical approaches to 
anger, there are also several different issues concerning 
the approaches to assessing the construct of anger. 
Issues in the Measurement of Anger 
As there are many different theoretical approaches to 
anger, there are also issues in the assessment of anger in 
relation to the construct of anger. The measurement of anger 
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has not been as distinct as the measurement of depression. 
The recent history of the measurement of anger begins in the 
1970rs with the emerging interest in the Type A behavior 
pattern (Friedman & Rosenman, 1974). During that time, three 
anger measurement scales were developed: The Reaction 
Inventory (Evans & Strangeland, 1971), The Anger Inventory 
(Novaco, 1975), and the Anger Self-Report (Zelin, Adler, & 
Myerson, 1972). After reviewing the research on these 
measures, Spielberger, Krasner and Solomon (1988) concluded, 
"there is a great deal of conceptual ambiguity in current 
theoretical interpretations of anger, hostility, and 
aggression and in the methods by which they are measured" 
(p.104). 
Spielberg-er 
Spielberger (1988) developed the State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory (STAXI) as a measure of anger, 
hostility and aggression. Spielberger developed the STAXI 
for two primary purposes: 
1.) to provide a method of assessing components of anger 
that could be used for detailed evaluations of normal 
and abnormal personality, and 2.) to provide a means of 
measuring the contribution of anger to the 
development of medical conditions, including 
hypertension, coronary heart disease, and cancer. (p .1) 
The STAXI was developed to measure the experience of 
anger as having two major components of state and trait 
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anger. Spielberger defined state anger as "an emotional 
state marked by subjective feelings that vary in intensity 
from mild annoyance or irritation to intense fury and rage" 
(p.1). Spielberger added that state anger usually goes hand 
in hand with muscular tension and the arousal of the 
autonomic nervous system. The intensity of state anger will 
vary over time as a "function of perceived injustice, attack 
or unfair treatment by others, and frustration resulting from 
barriers to goal-directed behavior" (Spielberger, 1988, 
p. 1). Spielberger defined trait anger as a propensity to 
perceive a wide spectrum of events as annoying or frustrating 
and with the tendency to respond to such events with more 
frequent elevations in state anger. Spielberger (1988) 
wrote, "individuals high in trait anger experience state 
anger more often and with greater intensity than individuals 
low in trait anger" (p. 1). Spielberger not only wished to 
measure the experience of anger, but also the expression of 
anger. Spielberger (1988) described anger expression with 
three major components: anger-out, anger-in, and anger-
control. Anger-out is the expression of anger towards others 
or objects in the external world. Anger-in is the 
suppression of angry feelings turned inward. Anger-control 
constitutes the individual differences in terms of the extent 
an individual will attempt to control their expression of 
anger. For a more detailed description of the STAXI see 
Spielberger, 1988. 
Through the construction of the STAXI, Spielberger 
implied that anger is a multi-dimensional construct based on 
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an individual's experience and expression of anger. Since 
the development of the STAXI, several studies examing its 
psychometric properties have been conducted. Fuqua, Leonard, 
Masters, Smith, Campbell; and Fischer (1991) examined the 
factor structure of the STAXI to see if the multidimensional 
structure of the items held up across all seven scales. 
Fuqua et al. , surprised by the results, reported: 
Frankly, the nature of the factors reported ... provides 
much more evidence of the structural validity than 
expected. Moreover, these results lend substantial 
credibility to the multidimensional theoretical 
treatment of the anger construct represented by the 
STAXI. (p. 445) 
Therefore, the STAXI presents a multidimensional 
perspective of anger that may fit well with the theoretical 
construct of anger. 
Anxiety 
Theories of Anxiety 
Anxiety is a concept that has generated a great deal of 
theoretical formulations and research (Sheldletsky & Endler, 
1973). Several different theoretical orientations have 
different definitions and explanations of what anxiety 
represents. The clinical, psychoanalytic, physiological, 
learning, and state-trait perspectives approach anxiety 
differently. 
Multiple constructs of anxiety are offered as: 
1.) A conflict between energy systems of the brain 
experienced as an unpleasant affective state or 
condition (Freud, 1936). 
2.) A reaction to an internal or external source of 
danger that result in disequilibrium of the energy 
systems (Freud, 1936) . 
3.) A maladaptive response to disrupted relationships 
with others (Sullivan, 1953). 
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4.) A physiological state of arousal caused by stimulus 
conditions in the environment and interpreted by the 
individual (Schachter, 1964). 
5.) A learned drive that creates neurotic conflict and 
the reduction of (drive) which can reinforce the 
learning of new experiences (Dollard & Miller, 1950; 
Mowrer, 1953) . 
6.) A condition of apprehension precipitated by a 
threat to values or characteristics basic to an 
individual's personality (May, 1950) . (Shedeltsky & 
Endler, 1973, p. 511) 
With so many varying perspectives of anxiety, it is 
apparent that it is a complex construct that requires further 
study. 
Clinical Definitions 
Classification of anxiety as a mental disorder is 
complex with several distinctions among different types of 
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anxiety. The characteristic features of the anxiety 
disorders are symptoms of anxiety and avoidance behavior 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987). Clinically, anxiety 
may be diagnosed ranging from organic anxiety syndrome, panic 
disorders with or without agoraphobia, social or simple 
phobia, obsessive compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987). The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition.-
Revised (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) stated, 
"recent studies indicate that Anxiety Disorders are the most 
frequently found in the general population, Simple Phobia 
being the most common Anxiety Disorder in the general 
population, but Panic Disorder the most common among people 
seeking treatment" (p. 235), It is apparent that anxiety, in 
one form or another, is one of the major mental health issues 
to be dealt with. 
Psychoanalytic Theory 
Anxiety is central to psychoanalytic theory in terms of 
understanding human behavior. Freud proposed two separate 
theories of anxiety. The first formation described neurotic 
anxiety as the result of blockage of unconscious impulses. 
When these impulses are repressed, they become susceptible to 
transformation into neurotic anxiety (Davison & Neale, 1982). 
However, the first theory on anxiety takes into account the 
situations around the repression of an unconscious impulse 
(Davison & Neale, 1982). In Freud's second theory of 
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anxiety, he made more explicit the circumstances surrounding 
the repression of an unconscious impulse. Davison and Neale 
stated: 
according to the first theory, neurotic anxiety develops 
through repression of impulses. In the second, anxiety 
about impulses signals the need for their repression. 
In a sense, according to the first theory 
we become anxious because we want things that we do not 
get; according to the second we are anxious because we 
fear our wants. (p. 4 3) 
Freud's second theory viewed anxiety as playing a 
functional role by signaling the ego to take action before 
becoming overwhelmed by overstimulation by id impulses 
(Davison & Neale, 1982). An example of the functionality of 
anxiety is that after the development of the ego in the first 
year of life, an individual is warned through anxiety that he 
or she may be "in danger of being reduced to an infantile 
state of helplessness through overstimulation by id impulses 
and other forces" (p. 43). Therefore, according to Freud, it 
is anxiety that protects the individual from giving in to the 
id impulses. 
Freud believed anxiety to be synonymous with fear, and 
he differentiated among three types of anxiety: objective, 
neurotic and moral anxiety (Hall, 1954). Objective anxiety is 
defined as the ego's reaction to danger in the real, external 
world. For example, objective anxiety is felt when one's 
life is in real jeopardy (Davison & Neale, 1982), as in an 
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impending car accident, physical assault, or dissertation 
defense. Objective anxiety is realistic fear. Moral anxiety 
is experienced by the ego as guilt or shame. It is the ego's 
fear of punishment from the superego resulting from the 
failure to follow the standards of moral conduct (Davison & 
Ne~le, 1982). Neurotic anxiety is "the fear of the 
disastrous consequences that are expected to follow if a 
previously punished id impulse is allowed expression" 
(Davison & Neale, 1982, p. 44). Hall (1954) noted: 
neurotic anxiety is based upon reality anxiety in the 
sense that a person has to associate an instinctual 
demand with an external danger before he learns to fear 
his instincts. As long as instinctual discharge does not 
result in punishment, one has nothing to fear from [the 
instincts] .... However, when impulsive behavior gets the 
person into trouble, as it usually does, he learns how 
dangerous the instincts are. (p. 67) 
Neurotic anxiety is expressed in several forms such as 
free-floating anxiety, phobias; and panic reaction. During 
free-floating anxiety, an individual appears to be 
apprehensive most of the time with no apparent form of 
reasonable danger. The theory of free-floating anxiety 
assumes that the individual is afraid of his/her own id, 
which is always with him/her (Davison & Neale, 1982). 
Phobias are described as the "intense irrational fear and 
avoidance of specific objects and situations, such as 
kittens, open spaces, closed spaces, and nonpoisonous snakes" 
41 
(Davison & Neale, 1982, p. 44). The feared objects and 
situations the phobias are based on are symbolic 
representations of an object or situation that was chosen 
earlier to gratify the id. Hall (1954) stated, "behind every 
neurotic fear there is a primitive wish of the id for the 
object of which one is afraid" (p. 65). The last form of 
neurotic anxiety described is the panic reaction. Davison 
and Neale (1982) defined the panic reaction as "a sudden and 
inexplicable outburst of severe and prolonged fear" (p. 45). 
According to Freud, neurotic and sometimes moral anxiety 
may be reduced through defense mechanisms (Davison & Neale, 
1982). A defense mechanism is an unconsciously utilized 
strategy which functions to protect the ego from anxiety. 
The most important defense mechanism is repression where 
unacceptable thoughts and impulses are pushed into the 
subconscious (Davison & Neale, 1982). Other types of defense 
mechanisms are projection, displacement, reaction formation, 
regression, and rationalization (Hall, 1954). 
It is evident that the psychoanalytic treatment of 
anxiety views anxiety as functional and necessary for the 
survival of the psyche. However, anxiety management through 
the use o~ defense mechanisms can be crippling to an 
individual; therefore, the goal of psychoanalysis is to work 
through the initial conflict. Davison and Neale (1982) 
stated, "psychoanalytic therapy attempts to remove the 
earlier repression and to help the patient face the childhood 
conflict and resolve it in the light of adult reality" 
(p. 45). 
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Physiological Theory 
Physiological theorists examine anxiety in the context 
of experimental science to understand the relationship 
between social and physiological correlates of anxiety (Henry 
& Ely, 1980). Selye's (1956) non-specific arousal response 
comes from this research orientation. The learning and 
behavioral theorists focus on proximal causes of stimuli of 
anxiety (Kaplan, 1974). Thus "anxiety and avoidance behavior 
are responses elicited and maintained by specifiable proximal 
stimuli" (Bootzin & Max, 1980, p. 37). Other studies in this 
area focus on the relationship between anxiety, stress, and 
coping behavior (Brady, 1980). Brady stated that the 
experimental analysis of stress and anxiety have focused on 
two general models. These models were labeled the concurrent 
model and the contingent model. Brady wrote, "the more 
traditional concurrent model emphasizes the effects of 
previous or accompanying environmental-behavioral 
interactions as determinants of psychophysiological stress 
and anxiety responses" (1980, 207). Classical examples of 
such laboratory studies is the early work of Pavlov (1879) 
and Cannon (1915) in which autonomic changes were related to 
environmental antecedents (Brady, 1980). Current 
applications of the concurrent model "extend the analysis of 
both respondent and operant conditioning effects on a broad 
range of biochemical, physiological, and behavioral processes 
(Brady and Harris, 1976)" (Brady, 1980, 207). The more 
contemporary contingent model focused on the environmental-
behavioral interactions that follow psychophysiological 
stress and anxiety responses (Miller, 1978). Brady stated: 
Experimental approaches within the framework of both 
concurrent and contingent models continue to provide a 
vigorous and productive research base for laboratory 
studies of both psychophysiology the the 
psychopathology of stress and anxiety. 
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Such investigative activities emphasize the effects of 
aversive learning and conditioning procedures on 
visceral and autonomic processes, and the broad range of 
laboratory experiments involved can be 
differentiated on the basis of the temporal 
ordering of behavioral and physiological events. (1980, 
p. 208). 
Physiological measures of anxiety utilized in these 
studies were heart rate, systolic and diastolic blood 
pressure elevation, corticosteriod levels, and plasma 
norepinephrine and epinephrine levels (Brady, 1980) and 
electrodermal !ability (Katkin, 1975) as observed in humans 
and laboratory animals. Though it seems that understanding 
the physiological aspect of anxiety is worthwhile and 
important, one is left to wonder how the cognitive aspect of 
anxiety would tie into this understanding. 
State-Trait Theory of Anxiety 
One model of anxiety that appears to stand up well in 
measurement is the state-trait anxiety model (Spielberger, 
1966). Cattell and Scheier (1961) provided empirical 
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evidence for the state-trait model through factor analysis 
for they extracted two distinct factors: trait anxiety and 
state anxiety. Spielberger {1972) defined state anxiety as a 
complex and unique emotional reaction "consisting of 
unpleasant, consciously-perceived feelings of tension and 
apprehension, with associated activation or arousal of the 
autonomic nervous system" {p. 29). Spielberger (1966) stated 
that trait anxiety measures a persons general tendency to 
perceive a wide spectrum of sittiations as threatening. 
In addition to the understanding of the concept of 
anxiety, the issue of assessment of anxiety raises several 
issues about the construct. 
Issues in the Measurement of Anxiety 
The issue of the measurement of anxiety has perplexed 
psychometrists for decades. This may be due to the fact that 
several different theoretical orientations offer many 
different definitions of the construct. Shedeltsky and 
Endler {1973) concluded, "it becomes apparent that 
measurement tools of anxiety devised on the basis of 
divergent theories might then reflect the theoretical 
confusion within the realm of research" (p. 511-512). 
Anxiety and Depression 
Another important issue in the measurement of anxiety is 
the overlap in measurement of the two constructs of anxiety 
and depression. Bramley, Easton, Morley, and Snaith (1988) 
provided: 
the separation of these categories is unsatisfactory 
since their definitions are not mutually 
exclusive, frequently being based upon symptoms which 
may occur in either state. Moreover etiology and 
treatment response may sometimes be the same for both 
categories. (p. 133) 
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This is an important issue to consider when attempting 
to understand both affective dimensions, so caution must be 
used when interpreting measures of both. The discussion will 
now focus on gender differences in affective dimensions. 
Gender and Affect 
Do men and women differ in how they experience affective 
states? In the last two decades, a great deal of literature 
in both the popular and professional press has focused on the 
differences between men and women concerning emotions. Do 
women experience a higher proportion of depression and 
anxiety than men due to the differences in social and 
political conditions between the genders? Psychotherapists 
with a feminist orientation suggested that women had 
displaced and internalized anger as a result of feeling 
powerless in a patriarchal society (Greenspan, 1983; Lerner, 
1985). In addition, Jean Baker Miller (1985) wrote that the 
sort of rage that leads to mental illness arises from the 
weight of accumulated experience. However; a review of the 
literature provides only limited empirical support for these 
hypotheses (Fischer, Smith, Leonard, Fuqua, Campbell, & 
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Masters,1993). Weisman and Klerman (1985) reported that 
women compose a majority of patients with the diagnosis of 
depression. In addition, Chino and Funabiki (1984) reported 
significant gender differences in the expression and 
experience of depression. While a number of studies reported 
documentation of gender differences concerning the 
relationship to proneness to depression (Abramson & Andrews, 
1982; Repetti & Crosby, 1984; Robbins & Tanck, 1984), 
criticisms exist of the meaningfulness and methodology of 
these findings (Fischer, in press, et al.). 
Gender differences in regard to other affective 
dimensions received the same results. Shope, Hedrick, and 
Green (1975) studied sex differences associated with the 
expression of anger; and they found that while women appear 
to be unable to express anger physically, they can be 
aggressive verbally. Biaggio (1980) wrote that men manifest 
greater overt expressions of anger. McCann and Biaggio 
(1980) found sex differences in terms of men showing greater 
physical and overall expressions of anger. However, Frodi, 
Macauley, and Thome (1977), based on a literature review, 
found that the hypothesis that men are more physically 
aggressive while women were more indirect in their expression 
of anger was not supported in the research. Biaggio (1989) 
found no significant gender differences in self-reports of 
behavioral reactions to the provocation of anger, and 
Averill (1982) reported no significant difference in gender 
concerning anger. With regards to anxiety, Barker and Barker 
(1977) suggested that women present an "anxiety proneness." 
In addition, Simon and Thomas (1983) reported that women had 
higher levels of both state and trait anxiety. In a study 
examining differences among genders looking at state/trait 
anger, state/trait anxiety, and depression, Fischer et al. 
(1993) found minimal differences among men and women. It 
appears that the issue of the differences in how men and 
women experience or express affect is still under 
examination. Perhaps other issues including attributional 
style will shed more light on this subject. 
Recent Studies in Attributional Style and Affect 
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Attributional style and depression have been linked 
together since Seligman's original work. However, there have 
been developments in the study of attributional style in 
relation to depression and other emotions (Flett, Pliner, & 
Blankstein, 1989; Ganellen, 1988; Stoltz & Galassi, 1989). 
Understanding the relationship between attributional style 
and affect is important in understanding the nature of 
affect. In addition, treatment of affective disorders will 
benefit from a better understanding of the attributional 
component of emotion. 
Attributional Style and Depression 
What does the current research report about the 
relationship between depression and attribution? Attribution 
and depression has been an active and growing field of 
interest in social psychology and counseling psychology in 
the past two decades (Antaki & Brewin, 1982). Is the 
reformulated theory of learned helplessness effective in 
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predicting an attributional style? Several studies have been 
done in the past few years in the area of depression and 
attribution. Tennen and Herzberger (1987) examined "the 
extent to which self esteem may be an important determinant 
of attributional style 11 (p. 72) . Tennen and Herzberger 
reported evidence that suggested that the attributional style 
among depressed subjects is also prevalent among low self-
esteem subjects. Ickes and Layden (1978) cited the 
comparisons between the research linking self-esteem and 
attributional preferences and with that linking depression 
and attributional style. Ickes and Layden stated, "the self-
esteem level and attributional style of clinically depressed 
patients appear to be essentially similar to those of the 
normal but low self-esteem subjects who were studied in our 
research" (p. 144). It appears that low self-esteem and 
depressed subjects make internal attributions for success and 
failure (Tennen & Herzberger, 1987). Tennen and Herzberger 
found that individual's tendency "to make internal 
attributions for failure and external, unstable, and specific 
attributions for success is characteristic of individuals 
with low self-esteem independent of depression status" (p. 
77). In fact, when Tennen and Herzberger deleted depression 
from the prediction model, self-esteem still accounted for 
the above attribution measures. This raises the question of 
which component accounts for a negative attributional style, 
self-esteem or depression. Also, what do these two 
constructs have in common? 
Weary, Elbin, and Hill (1981) proposed a study designed 
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to examine the consequences for depressed and nondepressed 
individuals who receive comparison feedback regarding their 
causal attributions of an event. Weary et al. (1987) found 
that depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in 
their attributions of hypothetical events; however, they 
found that depressed subjects responded "with more positive 
evaluations to the similar comparison other, and with more 
negative evaluations to the dissimilar comparison other, than 
did nondepressed subjects" (p. 609). It appears that the 
depressed individuals were hypersensitive to the differences 
between themselves and others, resulting in self 
consciousness. Weary et al. offered explanations for these 
findings in that depressed individuals may be more motivated 
to engage in or more sensitive to social comparison 
information due to a chronic lack of control and a resulting 
heightened sense of uncertainty. 
Riskind, Rholes, Brannon, and Burdick (1987) offered a 
confluence hypothesis in which "the predictive capacity of 
attributional style is contingent on the degree of 
correspondence between attributions and expectations; 
specifically, it stated that the working combination of a 
highly negative attributional style and negative outcome 
expectations represents the worst case of risk for future 
depression" (p. 350). Riskind et al. (1987) offered many 
reasons for this confluence hypothesis. First, any 
expectations for positive outcomes buffer an individual by 
partially blocking the negative attributional style 
mechanism. Second, Riskind et al. (1987) reasoned that ''the 
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impact of expected negative outcomes on depression depends on 
a person's attributional style and on the meanings attributed 
to the outcomes" (p. 350). Finally, Riskind et al. (1987) 
believed that negative expectations about outcomes may act as 
a buffer to protect an individual from depression when an 
individual has a healthy attributional style. Riskind et al. 
longitudinal study discovered that an attributional style may 
predict future levels of depressive symptomatology, and the 
authors indicated their study supported the reformulated 
helplessness model of Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale 
(1978) . 
Brown and Siegel (1988) examined the role of perceived 
control in the reformulated helplessness model. Brown and 
Siegel stated, "there is reason to suspect that 
controllability attributions moderate the relation between 
depression and the negative attributional style identified by 
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) 11 (p. 317). 
Concluding from their study, Brown and Siegel found that a 
negative attributional style predisposes one to depression 
depending on the perceived controllability of the event. 
Brown and Siegel believed their findings indicated that the 
relationship between attribution and depression depends on 
whether events are attributed to uncontrollable or 
controllable events, and that affective reactions to events 
may be determined by perception of control. Finally, Brown 
and Siegel believed the results supported others "who have 
claimed that the controllability dimension is an important 
element in the link between attribution and depression 
(Weiner & Litman-Adizes, 1980; Wortman & Dintzer, 1979)" 
(p. 319). 
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Attribution theory and depression have had a long and 
productive relationship over the past two decades while 
theorists strive to understand the correlation between the 
two. There are several studies in the literature that employ 
the use of attribution with clinical issues and populations 
including couples (Fincham, Beach, & Baucom, 1987), 
adjustment to rape (Meyer & Taylor,1986), use of paradoxical 
interventions (Hills, Gruszkos, & Strong, 1985), alcoholism 
(Dowd, Lawson, & Petosa, 1986), spousal abuse and 
responsibility (Schutte, Bouliege, Fix, & Malouff, 1986), 
incest blame (Jackson & Sandberg, 1985), and anxiety (Alden, 
1987). It appears that attribution plays a significant role 
in the affective dimension of depression. Otherwise; why 
would the literature be so flooded with so many studies 
connecting the two? 
How might attributional style relate to other affective 
dimensions? Where does the relationship lie between 
affective dimensions and attributional style? It seems 
logical that if there is such a strong relationship between 
attributional style and the experience of depression, that 
there is apt to be a similar relationship between attribution 
and other emotions? 
Attributional Style, Anger, and Anxiety 
While the affective dimension of depression has enjoyed 
a prosperous relationship with attributional style in the 
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literature, the relationship of the affective constructs of 
anger and anxiety to attributional style has not been nearly 
as well addressed. Strube (1985) stated, "the importance of 
attributional styles has been demonstrated primarily by 
research conducted within the learned helplessness paradigm" 
(p. 500). Much of the research on anger focuses in on an 
association between aggression and coronary heart disease 
(CHD) (Spielberger, Krasner, & Solomon, 1988) . In relation 
to anger and attributional style, a few studies have examined 
the effectiveness of attributional style in the understanding 
of the Type A Coronary-Prone Behavior Pattern (Rhodewalt, 
1984; Strube,1985) 
With the use of state-trait theory, it seems that the 
affective dimension of anger may relate well to attribution. 
As stated before with the concept of depression, how might 
the experience of state-trait anger relate to attributional 
style of an individual? However, no study to this date has 
examined the relationship between the STAXI and the ASQ or 
the EASQ. This may be due to the fact that the STAXI is a 
relatively new instrument. 
As with anger, few studies have examined the 
relationship between attribution and anxiety. A few studies 
exist that explore attribution and anxiety (Ganellen, 1988); 
however, the literature goes no further in that area. As 
with anger, while using the state-trait theory of anxiety, it 
is believed that this construct would mesh well with 
attributional style. 
Anxiety and depression have been linked clinically (APA, 
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1987), and definitionally (Mook et al, 1990), therefore, 
anxiety may interact with attributional style in a similar 
way as does depression. Additionally, social learning theory 
ties anger to the perspective and learning of anger; 
therefore, one might argue that such a conceptualization of 
anger would mesh with attributional style. Attribution is 
based upon observation and past experiences of causality. 
Social learning theory's foundation is concept of learning 
through observation and past experiences. Therefore, there 
may be a link between the experience of anger and 
attributional style, as there is one between depression and 
attributional style. 
Purpose of the Study 
The present study was conducted to identify the 
relationship of attribution to affective dimensions. Much of 
the literature on depression tied this affective dimension to 
attribution in explaining the cognitive component of the 
emotion. However; little of the literature has focused on 
other affective dimsnsions and attribution. One problem is 
that these affective dimensions suffer due to difficulty in 
defining these constructs, thus leading to ambiguity in 
assessment of these dimensions. However, the instruments 
have demonstrated some validity and reliability in the 
measurement of these affective dimensions and attribution. 
The present study examined the relationship of 
attribution to the affective experience, especially with 
reference to depression, anxiety and anger. It was 
hypothesized that attributional style will play a mediating 
role in the experience of these affective dimensions. 
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Research Questions 
1. Does attributional style account for a significant 
proportion of variance in the affective dimensions of anger, 
depression, and anxiety? Does affect account for a 
significant proportion of variance in the cognitive 
dimensions of Globality, Internality, and Stability? 
Null Hypothesis One: There is no significant 
relationship between the sets of cognitive and affective 
variables. 
2. Does attributional style relate differentially to 
state and trait aspects of these affective dimensions? Is 
there a clear pattern of relationships between state or trait 
affect and style of attribution. 
Null Hypothesis Two: There is no difference in 
patterns of relationships among state or trait affect and 
style of attribution. 
3. Is there a gender difference among these findings? 
Null Hypothesis Three: There are no significant gender 
differences in relation to attributional style and affect. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Subjects 
The sample consisted mainly of undergraduate students 
enrolled in a large Midwestern University. Out of the 300 
subjects surveyed, there were 254 completed protocols with no 
item omissions; therefore, the pool of subjects consisted of 
254 valid cases. 58% (147) were females and 42% (107) 
were males. The subjects ages ranged from 18 to 59 years of 
age; however, the bulk of the subjects (79%) ranged in age 
from 18 to 22 years of age, and the median age was 20 years 
of age. The majority of the subjects were single (85%) and 
Caucasian (77%). The majority of the subjects were 
classified as Sophomores (35%), Freshmen (23%), Juniors 
(22%), and Seniors (17%). This sample described a 
traditional undergraduate student population. 
Instruments 
There are several instruments available to measure 
concepts as depression, anger, and anxiety. The measures 
chosen for this study are the State-Trait Anger Expression 
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Inventory (Spielberger,1988), the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger, 1983; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970), The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1972), 
and the Expanded Attributional Style Inventory (Peterson & 
Villanova, 1988). These instruments were chosen for several 
reasons. First, the instruments were believed to represent 
the constructs utilized in the study. Secondly, the 
instruments were believed to be reliable and posses moderate 
evidence for the validity for the instruments for the purpose 
of this study. Following is a description of each 
instrument. 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI), a 
relatively new instrument, is a 44 item self report measure 
of the expression and experience of anger. The theoretical 
basis for the STAXI has been well developed in several 
articles (Spielberger, Johnson, Russell, Crane, Jacobs, & 
Warden, 1985; Spielberger, Krasner, Solomon, 1988; 
Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983) . The commercial 
form of the STAXI provides for the scoring of eight scale 
scores. These scales are operationalized in the manual for 
the STAXI (Spielberger, 1988) as follows: 
a. State Anger (S-Anger) - A 10 item scale which the 
intensity of angry feelings at a particular time. 
b. Trait Anger (T-Anger) A 10 item scale which 
measures a general propensity to experience anger. T-
Anger has two subscales: 
1. Angry Temperament (T-Anger/T) - A 4 item T-Anger 
subscale which measures a general propensity to 
experience and express anger with out specific 
provocation. 
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2. Angry Reaction (T-Anger/R) - A 4 item T-Anger 
subscale that measures the disposition to express anger 
when criticized or treated unfairly. 
c. Anger-In (AX/In) - An 8 item anger expression scale 
that measures the frequency with which angry feelings 
are held in or suppressed. 
d. Anger-Out (AX/Out} - An 8 item anger expression 
scale that measures how often an individual expresses 
anger toward other people or objects. 
e. Anger-Control( AX/Con) - An 8 item scale that 
measures the frequency with which an individual attempts 
to control the expression of anger. 
f.Anger Expression (AX/EX) - A research scale based on 
the responses to the 24 items of the AX/In, AX/Out, and 
AX/Con scales which provides a general index of the 
frequency that anger is expressed, regardless of the 
direction of expression. (p.1) 
Coefficient alphas £or the eight scales ranged from .73 
to .93 (Spielberger, 1988) indicating adequate internal 
consistency for research purposes. The STAXI manual 
indicated that the test-retest reliability of the eighth 
scales has been examined; however, this information has not 
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yet been published. Validity data in the STAXI manual 
include correlations with personality measures and blood 
pressure (Spielberger, 1988). Factorally, the structure of 
the STAXI is consistent with the multidimensional theoretical 
concepts of anger (Fuqua et al,;1991). In addition, several 
other validity studies are cited in the manual. Convergent 
validity of the trait-anger scale was evaluated in terms of 
correlations with the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory 
(BDHI,1957), and the Hostility (HO; Cook & Medley, 1954) and 
the Overt Hostility (HV; Schultz, 1954) scales of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Spielberger 
(1988) reported "significant correlations were found across 
samples for both males and females, providing strong 
concurrent validity of the T-Anger scale as a measure of 
anger" (p. 12). Spielberger (1988) found moderate 
correlations between the Trait-Anger scale and the Trait-
Anxiety and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire's (EPQ) 
Neuroticism scales that are consistent with clinical theory 
and observations in that persons high in trait-anxiety and 
neuroticism usually experience angry feelings that they 
unable to readily express. Spielberger (1988) reported low 
positive correlations between the Trait-Anger scale and the 
EPQ Psychoticism scale. This finding would indicate that 
persons with high scores on psychoticism experience anger 
somewhat more frequently than persons with low psychoticism 
scores. Spielberger (1988) found low to moderate 
correlations between the State-Anger scale and the Trait-
Anxiety and the EPQ Neuroticism and Psychoticism scales. 
59 
These findings indicated "individuals with psychopathological 
personality traits experienced more intense angry feelings 
than emotionally stable people at the time they were tested" 
(Spielberger, 1988, p. 12). Spielberger (1988) reported 
moderately high correlations between State-Anger and State-
Anxiety for both sexes. Spielberger felt that this 
relationship reflects an important aspect of the American 
socialization process. Spielberger elaborated that "if 
aggressive behaviors in young children are motivated by angry 
feelings, and such behaviors are consistently punished, an 
association will develop between feelings of anger and 
anxiety so that feeling angry will elicit elevations in S-
Anxiety in anticipation of punishment" (p. 12). 
Due to the strong evidence of a relationship between 
Trait-Anger and measures of hostility, and the important 
differences between hostility and anger as personality 
constructs as suggested in the research literature, 
Spielberger (1988) wished to further evaluate the 
relationship between the Trait-Anger scale and hostility 
measures. Spielberger (1988) performed a factor analysis of 
items comprised of the Trait-Anger scale, the State-Trait 
Personality Inventory's (STPI, Spielberger, 1979) Trait-
Anxiety and Trait-Curiosity scales. These items were 
factored with such marker variables as _the Trait-Anger score, 
the BDHI total and subscale scores, the MMPI HO and HV scale 
scores, and the STPI Trait-Anxiety and Trait-Curiosity scale 
scores. Spielberger (1988) found in a three factor solution 
that "the first factor was clearly an Anger-Hostility factor 
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with T-Anger and Buss-Durkee total scores having the highest 
loadings" (p. 12). Factor two was labeled Trait-Anxiety with 
the highest loadings being the Trait-Anxiety scales the HO 
scale, and the BDHI Guilt, Irritability, Suspicion, and 
Resentment scales. Spielberger (1988) reported that the 
third factor was defined primarily by the Trait-Curiosity 
scale, with a negative secondary loading on Trait Anxiety. 
In a four factor solution, Spielberger found that Factor One 
(Anger-Hostility) in the three factor solution divided into 
two separate factors. In the four factor solution, Factor 
One became Anger, and Factor Four became Hostility. Both the 
three factor and four factor solutions yielded similar 
results for males and females (Spielberger, 1988). Overall, 
the validity of the STAXI scales appears to be encouraging 
for research applications. 
State-Trait Anxiet~ Inventory 
Form Y of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI) is made up of two twenty item scales. One is designed 
to measure anxiety as a situational experience (State), and 
the second scale measures a general disposition to respond 
with anxiety across situations (Trait). In the STAI manual, 
Spielberger (1983) reported a median coefficient alpha of .93 
for State Anxiety and .90 for Trait Anxiety. Trait Anxiety 
reported test-retest reliabilities in the moderate to high 
range. State Anxiety reported significantly lower test-
retest reliabilities which one would expect given the 
situational nature of the construct. 
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The STAI manual (Spielberger, 1983) reported a number of 
indicators of validity of the STAI scales. Martuza and 
Kallstrom (1974) found evidence of validity of the STAI 
scales within a graduate educational level environment. 
Martuza and Kallstrom provided results that support the 
State-Trait construct of anxiety in their validity study. In 
addition, the authors found "positive evidence of the 
validity of State-Trait Anxiety Inventory scales for 
measuring individual A-State and A-Trait differences among 
graduate students in education when under varying degrees of 
academic stressu (p. 366). Hedberg (1971) reported that the 
validity data of the STAI provided good support for the 
theoretical basis of the state-trait structure of anxiety. 
Concurrent validity is demonstrated with other anxiety 
measures as the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale and the IPAT 
Anxiety scale, yielding correlations between .75 and .85 for 
college students and psychiatric patients (Hedberg, 1971). 
Hedberg reported "construct validity is demonstrated by the 
fact that the A-State items consistently vary with different 
experimental states of stress while the A-Trait items do not" 
(p. 389). 
In a review of the STAI, Hedberg (1971) summarized the 
strengths of the inventory: 
The STAI has numerous strengths to commend it as 
significant measure of anxiety. For example, it is 
brief, inexpensive, and easy to administer, score, and 
interpret. It has been carefully developed both 
methodologically and theoretically. The high degree of 
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internal consistency and the reporting of critical 
ratios for each item allows for the wise choice of items 
when designing an abbreviated version of the scale for 
special use for dividing the items into two parallel 
forms when independent repeated measures are desired. 
Its unique contribution is the dual measure of A~Trait 
and A-State anxiety by means of a brief, reliable, 
objective, and practical 
inventory. (p. 390) 
Levitt (1967) concluded, after evaluating 
several anxiety inventories, that the STAI was the most 
carefully developed anxiety inventory from both the 
methodological and theoretical standpoints. It appears that 
the STAI is an effective measure of state-trait anxiety. 
Beck Depression Inventory 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) consists of twenty 
one items designed to measure the general syndrome of 
depression. 
of intensity. 
across items. 
study. 
The items are rated on a 4 - point scale (0 - 3) 
The BDI is scored by totaling the ratings 
The total BDI score will be used in this 
The BDI is a frequently used instrument that was 
designed to measure the intensity of depression (Ponterotto, 
Pace, & Kavan, 1989). The BDI was originally developed by 
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, and Erbaugh (1961), and it was 
subsequently revised by Beck (1979). The BDI's psychometric 
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properties are well established as it has been used in over 
500 reported studies (Ponterotto et al., 1989). Beck, Steer, 
& Garbin (1988) reported the EDI as having coefficient 
alphas ranging from .76 to .95 with a mean of .86 for 25 
studies using a variety of clinical and nonclinical samples. 
Sacco (1981) questioned whether the EDI measures state 
or trait depression. Beck et al. (1988) suggested that the 
changes in the administration instructions which were 
introduced at the time of the BDI's revision have 
successfully addressed this issue. As evidence, the authors 
reported 10 studies assessing the BDI's stability over 
varying lengths of time. These authors reported test-retest 
reliabilities for the BDI ranging from .48 to .86 for 
psychiatric populations, and ranging from .60 to .83 for 
nonpsychiatric populations. This reflected that the BDI 
possessed adequate stability for the purposes of this study. 
The validity of the BDI has been examined in literally 
hundreds of studies. Beck et al. (1988) cited several 
studies supporting the concurrent, content, discriminate, 
construct, and factorial validity of the EDI. Beck et al. 
provided evidence for concurrent validity by citing several 
studies that correlate the BDI with the Clinical Rating of 
Depression, the Hamilton Rating Scale, The Zung Self-Rating 
Scale, the MMPI~D Scale, and various other methods of 
measuring depression. Beck et al. concluded that the EDI 
demonstrates acceptable levels of concurrent validity. 
Ponterotto et al. (1989) provided evidence for content 
validity of the BDI by stating" the BDI covers a wide range 
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of symptoms associated with depression, including affective, 
cognitive, physiological, and social or behavioral symptoms" 
(p. 304). In terms of discriminate validity, Beck et al. 
stated that the BDI had been successful in its ability to 
distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric groups. 
However, the BDI had been less successful in distinguishing 
between different depressive disorders. The construct 
validity of the BDI had been ascertained due to its ability 
to detect a variety of relationships between depression and 
other variables. Beck et al. provided evidence in studies 
that find BDI scores to be inversely related to an indicator 
of sleep difficulty (REM latency). In addition, the BDI 
correlated significantly with self-report measures of 
anxiety. The BDI has been able to distinguish between groups 
diagnosed from the DSM-III-Ras primary major depression and 
dysthymic disorder and primary generalized anxiety disorder. 
According to factor analysis studies using various 
extraction methods, the number of factors ranged from three 
to seven (Beck et al., 1988) . Beck et al. cited a latent 
structure analysis that suggests the BDI represents one 
underlying general syndrome of depression. This general 
syndrome of depression can be broken down into three highly 
intercorrelated factors that include: a) negative attitudes 
toward self, b) performance impairment, and c) somatic 
disturbance. According to the numerous validity studies, the 
BDI has earned general acceptance as a research scale. 
The Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire 
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ), as 
developed by Peterson, Semmel, Metalsky, Abramson, von 
Baeyer, and Seligman (1982),was designed to assess 
explanatory style by means of a self-report questionnaire 
(Peterson & Villanova, 1988). Subjects are given six good 
and six bad hypothetical events involving themselves (e.g. 
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you go out on a dinner date and it goes poorly). Then the 
subject will write in his/her own words representing "one 
major cause" of each event. Next the subject rates each 
cause along 7-point scales according to its Internality, 
Stability and Globality. ASQ scores for each dimension are 
calculated by averaging ratings across events, separately for 
good and bad events. The ASQ is reported to have a modest 
reliability. Internal consistency of each dimension ranges 
from .4 to .7, and as a result, most researchers combine the 
scores from all three dimensions to improve reliability 
(Peterson & Villanova, 1988}. As a result of this modest 
reliability, Peterson and Villanova (1988) have introduced a 
new form of the ASQ, by the name of the Expanded 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ). The Authors 
attempted to improve the reliability by lengthening the ASQ 
to include 24 bad events. Peterson and Villanova stated, 
"because the helplessness reformulation is not explicitly 
concerned with good events, we did not include them" (p. 87). 
As they expected, the reliabilities of the individual 
dimensions of the EASQ did improve. Internal consistencies, 
as estimated by Cronbach's (1951} coefficient alpha were 
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reported as . 66 for internality, . 85 for Stability, and . 88 
for Globality. Stability and Globality of attributional 
style were highly correlated and largely independent of 
internality (Peterson, 1988). In addition, all three 
dimensions of explanatory style correlated significantly with 
depressive symptoms as measured by the BDI (Peterson & 
Villanova, 1988). The Authors found support for predictive 
validity due to the correlations between the dimensions of 
explanatory style and ratings of actual bad events. Other 
studies since have used the EASQ Riskind, Rholes, Brannon, 
& Burdick, 1987; Stoltz & Galassi, 1989 ) . 
Procedure 
Subjects were surveyed during the summer of 1991 at a 
large Midwestern university; Subjects were obtained from 
mid-size (40) to large (80) service courses in History, 
Political Science, English, and Human Sexuality. The two 
researchers approached the instructors of these courses for 
permission to survey their students. After instructor 
consent was given, times were arranged to conduct the survey. 
After the researcher was introduced by the instructor, he/she 
followed several standardized steps to insure consistent 
gathering of data. At first, the subjects were informed that 
participation in this study was voluntary on part of the 
subject. Next the researcher read aloud the consent form 
while participating subjects completed and signed the form. 
The signed forms were collected by the researcher, while the 
subjects kept a consent form of their own. Next the 
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researcher passed out the survey packet to the subjects 
containing a demographics sheet and the four questionnaires. 
The researcher explained the demographic form, and he/she 
pointed out each survey and the accompanying answer sheet. 
The researcher asked the subjects refrain from putting their 
name on the any part of the protocol. The researcher 
reminded the subjects that their responses would remain 
anonymous throughout the procedure. The cover of the packet 
was a brief demographic questionnaire to assess age, gender, 
marital status, grade level, and ethnic status. Next the 
packet consisted of the STAI, STAXI, BDI, and the EASQ. The 
order of these instruments were sequenced in equal 
proportions in as many possible combinations. Response times 
of the subjects varied from 25 minutes to 50 minutes. After 
the subject had completed the packet, they returned it to the 
researcher, who thanked them for their assistance. 
Design of the Study 
According to Stevens (1986), "canonical correlation is 
another means of breaking down the association for two sets 
of variables, and is appropriate if the wish is to 
parsimoniously describe the number and nature of mutually 
independent relationships existing between the two sets" (p. 
373). In response to research question one, canonical 
correlations were employed to examine the relationship 
between the set of affective variables (Scales of the STAXI, 
STAI and BDI) and the set of cognitive variables (Scales of 
the EASQ: Internality, Globality and Stability). In 
addition, three exploratory multiple regressions were 
employed as a follow up to the canonical correlation. In 
response to research question two, an analysis of the 
loadings on the variates of state and trait variables, in 
addition to an examination of the multiple r - squared 
between the state measures and the trait measures, was 
examined. In response to research question three, T-Tests 
for each gender were examined. For the entire study, alpha 
was set at .05. The data was analyzed using the SPSS 
statistical package (SPSS,1990). 
68 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
To examine the relationship between attributional style 
and affect, a sample of 300 subjects were administered a 
series of self-report measures: the STAI, the STAXI, the BDI, 
and the EASQ. The data were analyzed through a series of 
statistical procedures. After the data were coded and 
entered, it was apparent that only 254 protocols were 
complete in terms of responses; therefore only 254 valid 
cases were statistically analyzed. A canonical correlation 
analysis was utilized to examine whether a relationship 
existed between the sets of cognitive and affective 
variables. To further investigate the relationship between 
the sets of variables, a multiple regression analysis was 
performed. To determine if there were gender differences in 
the sample, t-tests were employed. The following section 
will present the results of the data analysis for this study. 
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Research Question One 
Does attributional style account for a significant 
proportion of variance in the affective dimensions of anger, 
depression, and anxiety? Does affect account for a 
significant proportion of variance in the cognitive 
dimensions of Globality, internality, and stability? Null 
Hypothesis One: There is no significant relationship between 
the sets of cognitive and affective variables. To 
investigate Research Question One, a canonical correlation 
analysis was performed. However; before the results are 
shown, a discussion of the canonical correlation analysis is 
provided. 
Discussion of the Canonical Correlational Analysis Procedure 
A discussion of the nature and interpretation of a 
canonical correlation analysis will be presented. A 
canonical correlation analysis was performed to determine if 
there are relationships, and what nature of relationships 
exist between the cognitive and affective sets of variables. 
Stevens (1986) stated, "the canonical correlation is still 
another example of the mathe~atical maximization procedure 
(as were multiple regression and principle components), which 
partitions the total association through the use of 
uncorrelated pairs of linear combinations" (p. 375). 
According to Stevens (1986), the canonical correlation 
analysis first searches for two linear combinations which 
posses the maximum Pearson correlation. Stevens (1986) 
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wrote, "the maximized correlation for the scores on the two 
linear composites (rulvl) is called the largest linear 
canonical correlation, and we denote it by R1 " (p. 373). 
Next, the canonical correlation procedure looks for a second 
pair of linear combinations that is uncorr~lated with the 
first pair, and the Pearson correlation between this pair is 
the next largest possible correlation. The second largest 
canonical correlation is denoted by R2 . Stevens added, "when 
we say that this second pair of canonical variates are 
uncorrelated with the first pair, we mean that (1) the 
canonical variates within each set are uncorrelated, i.e. 
ru1u2 = r vlv2 = 0 and (2) the canonical variates are 
uncorrelated across sets, i.e. rulv2 = rv1u2 = 0" (p. 375). 
How many canonical correlations are possible within sets of 
variables? Stevens (1986) explained, "if one hasp variables 
in one set and q in the other set, the number of possible 
canonical correlations is min {p,q) = m (cf. Tatsuoka, 1971, 
p. 186 .as to the reason why)" (p. 375). 
After one determines if the canonical correlation is 
significant, the squared canonical correlation coefficient is 
examined to determine the amount of variance shared by the 
sets of variables. Thompson (1984) stated, "a squared 
canonical correlation coefficient indicates the proportion of 
variance that the two composites derived from the two 
variable sets linearly share" (p. 14). In order to examine 
the amount of relationship that exists between the sets of 
variables, the squared canonical correlation coefficient will 
be analyzed. 
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Thompson reported, "when a statistically significant 
canonical correlation is identified, the researcher will want 
to interpret the extent to which the various variables 
contributed to the identified multivariate relationship" (p. 
21). In order to interpret the canonical function, several 
other coefficients may be cilculated to aid in interpretation 
(Thompson, 1984). Stevens (1986) proposed two methods to 
interpret the canonical variates: 1, "Examine the 
standardized coefficients. 2. Examine the canonical 
variate-variable correlations" (p. 379) or structure 
coefficients. The standardized coefficients may be obtained 
"by multiplying the raw coefficient for each variable by the 
standard deviation for that variable" (Stevens, 1986, p. 
235). A structure coefficient may be defined as the 
correlation between the variable and the canonical variates 
(Stevens, 1986). However, both of these methods are 
unreliable unless the N/total number of variables is at least 
42/1 if interpreting the the largest two canonical 
correlations, and around 20/1 if interpreting only the 
largest canonical correlation (Stevens,1986). In addition, 
Stevens (1986) wrote that the degree of multicollinearity, 
along with the N/total number of variables ratio, must be 
investigated to determine how much confidence one may place 
in the results. 
Several authors argued for the use of structure 
coefficients as opposed to the standardized coefficients as a 
reliable interpretation aid ( Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973; 
Levine, 1977; Meredith, 1964; Thompson, 1984). Meredith 
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(1964) suggested, "if the variables within each set are 
moderately intercorrelated the possibility of interpreting 
the canonical variates by inspection of the appropriate 
regression weights [standardized coefficients] is practically 
nil" (p. 55), In addition, Levine (1977) stated, "I 
specifically say that one h..a.s. to do this [interpret structure 
coefficients] since I firmly believe as long as one wants 
information about the nature of the canonical correlation 
relationship, not merely the computation of the [canonical 
function] scores, one must have the structure matrix 
[emphasis in original]" (p. 20). Kuylen and Verhallen (1981) 
stated the main reason for choosing the structure 
coefficients over the standardized coefficients. They wrote: 
In the first place these weights [function 
coefficients] may be unstable due to multicollinearity. 
Some variables may obtain a small weight or even a 
negative weight because of the fact that the 
variance in a variable has already been explained by 
other variables. In this type of situation the weights 
do not give a clear picture of the relevance of the 
variables. (p. 219) 
If there is a moderate amount of multicollinearity, use 
of standardized coefficients will confuse interpreting the 
nature of the canonical variates. For that reason, Thompson 
(1984) remarked that the structure coefficients are 
important. Structure coefficients may be interpreted in the 
same manner as factor analysis loadings in factor analysis 
(Stevens, 1986) . A structure matrix with structure 
coefficients will be utilized in the interpretation of this 
study's results. 
Interpretation of the Canonical Correlation Analysis 
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The interpretation of the canonical correlation analysis 
for this study is as follows. The ratio of N/total number of 
variables for this sample was around 23/1 (254/11). In the 
process of examining the data using a canonical correlation 
analysis, a single significant pair of canonical variates 
was extracted. (Re= .38, p < .05). Due to the fact that 
only one significant canonical correlation was found, the 
ratio of subjects to variables will be sufficient for 
reliable interpretation of the results. Based on the squared 
canonical correlation coefficient (Rc2= .14), it is evident 
that these variates shared 14% of the common variance. 
Therefore; a significant relationship does exist between the 
sets of variable. Thus Null Hypothesis One was rejected. 
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Research Question Two 
Does attributional style relate differentially to state 
and trait aspects of these affective dimensions? Is there a 
clear pattern of relationships between state or trait affect 
and style of attribution. Null Hypothesis Two: There is no 
difference in patterns of relationships among state or trait 
affect and style of attribution. Further examination of the 
canonical correlation analysis through the structure 
coefficients and a multiple regression analysis were analyzed 
to investigate Research Question Two. 
structure coefficient Analysis 
The next question is what is the nature of that 
relationship? In order to determine the nature of the 
canonical covariates, an analysis of the structure 
coefficients was performed. It appears that of the affective 
set of variables, Trait Anxiety (Traxtot) loaded most heavily 
on the variate with a structure coefficient of -.9657. In 
fact, Trait Anxiety accounted for most of the variate. This 
indicated that Trait Anxiety accounted for most of the 
variance on the variate. In other words, Trait Anxiety 
strongly related to the linear composite of the attributional 
style variables. In addition, State Anxiety (Staxtot), 
Depression (Becktot), and Anger-In (AXIN) also loaded 
moderately on the variate with structure coefficients ranging 
from -.60655 to -.64863. Though the relationship was not as 
strong as it was with Trait Anxiety, it seems that State 
Anxiety, Depression, and Anger-In correlated to a stable, 
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global, and internal attributional style. 
Upon examining the cognitive set of variables, it 
appeared that stability loaded highest on the variate with a 
structure coefficient of -.93239. Globality loaded the next 
highest on the variate with a structure coefficient of -
.81497, while Internality only loaded with a structure 
coefficient of -.20229. These results indicated that 
Stability and Globality related strongly to the linear 
composite of the affective set of variables, while 
Internality had a very weak relationship with affect. Please 
refer to Table One. 
Insert Table One here. 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
In order to further understand the nature of the 
relationship between the two sets of variables, multiple 
regression analysis were done as an exploratory follow-up. It 
is a natural progression to follow up the canonical 
correlation analysis with a multiple regression analysis for 
as Pedhazur (1982) stated, "It should be noted from the onset 
that MR [multiple regression] can be viewed as a special case 
of CA [canonical analysis] - that is, when there is only one 
dependent variable, or one criterion, CA reduces to MR" (p. 
721). In multiple regression, the squared multiple 
correlation coefficient, R2, is utilized to indicate the 
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proportion of variance of the dependent variable that is 
accounted for by the independent variables (Pedhazur, 1982). 
On the basis of the R2, for the dependent variable Globality, 
the set of affective variables accounted for 10% of the 
variance. Of that 10%, Trait Anxiety accounted for 9% of 
that variance. For the variable Internality, the set of 
affective variables accounted for 6% of the total variance. 
Trait anxiety accounted for 3% of the Internality variable, 
while State Anger accounted for 2% of the variance. The 
affective variables accounted for 13% of the Stability 
variable. The majority of the variance (11%) was accounted 
for by Trait Anxiety. Overall, Trait Anxiety appeared to 
have the strongest relationship with the cognitive variables. 
This finding was not surprising in that the canonical 
correlation analysis, Trait ~nxiety loaded the highest on all 
three cognitive dimensions. It appeared that there may be a 
Trait quality to two dimensions of Globality and Stability of 
Attributional style, thus Null Hypothesis 
Two was rejected. See Table Two for the summary tables of 
the multiple regression analysis. 
Insert Table Two here. 
The Issue of Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is an issue that needs to be 
considered when interpreting multiple regression analysis. 
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Pedhazur {1982) stated that there is no consensus on 
definition of multicollinearity. However, Pedhazur (1982) 
stated, "problems emanating from intercorrelations among 
independent variables are generally discussed under the 
heading of multicollinearity11 (p. 233). Multicollinearity is 
a major factor as to why some researchers prefer the use of 
structure coefficients as opposed to standardized 
coefficients in canonical correlation analysis for the reason 
that standardized coefficients are the canonical correlation 
equivalent of the multiple regression standardized regression 
coefficients (Stevens, 1986). Pedhazur wrote, "high 
multicollinearity has extremely adverse effects on the 
standard errors of the regression coefficients, hence on 
tests of their statistical significance and their confidence 
interval" (p. 235). Therefore, it is important to inspect the 
correlations among the independent variables. 
In this data base, it appeared that multicollinearity 
did play a moderate role in the multiple regressions due to 
the moderate intercorrelations among the affective 
(independent) variables. Trait Anxiety had a.75 correlation 
with State Anxiety, and a .58 correlation with depression. 
This moderate multicollinearity accounted for the heavy 
loadings of Trait Anxiety's standardized coefficients upon 
the set of cognitive variables in the canonical correlation 
analysis. However, there appeared to be very low 
correlations among the affective and cognitive variables and 
among the cognitive variables themselves, with the exception 
of the moderate correlation between Stability and Globality 
(.57). See Table Three for the intercorrelations among the 
variables. 
Insert Table Three here. 
Research Question Three 
79 
Is there a gender difference among these findings? Null 
Hypothesis Three: There are no significant gender 
differences in relation to attributional style and affect. 
t-test analysis was performed to examine Research Question 
Three. 
T-Test Analysis 
In order to examine the gender effects among the 
variables, t-tests were calculated. Upon examining the t-
tests, no significant difference was found between men and 
women on the variables. Thus Null Hypothesis Three was not 
rejected. See Table Four. 
Insert Table Four here. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
This study was performed in order to achieve a better 
understanding of the relationship between attributional style 
and affective dimensions. This was a multivariate 
examination employing multiple measures of attributional 
style and affect.It was done with the belief that a clear 
relationship would emerge, relating style of attributing 
cause to events and emotional state. In summarizing the 
results, the first research question inquired if a 
relationship existed between attributional style and affect. 
Upon examination of the results, there appeared to be a 
relationship between cognition and affect. The canonical 
correlation analysis revealed that a significant relationship 
did exist between the sets of variables. The second research 
question posed, if there was a relationship, did the 
construct of state-trait affect relate to attributional 
style? Due to the adequate amount of common variance that 
the cognitive variables shared with Trait Anxiety, a 
relationship may be reflected between cognition 
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and the trait dimension of affect. In addition, the 
variables depression, state anxiety, and anger expressed 
inward loaded substantially. Globality and Stability 
related heavily to the variate while the variable 
Internality did not. The loadings of Globality and 
Stability may suggest a state-trait dimension in 
attributional style. The third research question asked if 
there was a gender difference in the sample concerning 
attributional style and affect. After reviewing the t-
tests, it was evident that there were no differences between 
males and females. What are the implications of these 
findings? What does this suggest about the nature of affect 
and attributional style? 
The Relationship of Attributional Style and Affect 
The results indicated that a relationship does exist 
between attributional style and affect. What is the nature 
of this relationship? Specifically, it appears that Trait 
Anxiety,Depression, State Anxiety, and Anger E:xpressed Inward 
loaded substantially on the linear composite of the variables 
Globality, Stability, and Internality. These variables may 
be labeled as anxiety and depression. It is evident that 
anxiety, in both the state and trait forms, exist. 
Depression is evident, not only by the loading of depression, 
but perhaps from the loading of anger expressed inward. The 
psychoanalytic definition of depression given is anger 
expressed inward toward one self. Tavris stated "most 
psychoanalytic writers subsequently put aggression or anger 
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depressive and anxiety disorders. However; there is no 
mention of an anger disorder. It seems that anger is only 
mentioned in reference to other disorders as a symptom. When 
anger is presented as a symptom of other disorders, it is 
usually in the form of aggressive acts or extreme outbursts 
of anger, not the average, or day to day, experience of 
anger. In addition, several self help books advocate the 
expressing of anger as being healthy (Tavris, 1989); however, 
there are not many books on the selves of books'tores that 
encourage the expression of anxiety or depression. Rather, 
they offer advice on how to alleviate these emotions. 
Though all three emotions, depression, anxiety, and 
anger, are part of the human experience, why are depression 
and anxiety seen as more debilitating than anger? Perhaps it 
is because anxiety and depression correspond to a rigid 
attributional style, thus making these emotions more 
internalized and crippling. Perhaps the relationship of 
anxiety and depression to a negative or rigid attributional 
style make the experience of these emotions more 
characterlogical and pathological than anger to deserve such 
diagnosis. It seems that the pathological experience of 
anger is usually manifested in terms of physical, not 
psychological, pathology such as high blood pressure and 
coronary heart disease. Perhaps, it seems that anxiety and 
depression affect the cognitive aspect of pathology more, 
while the experience of anger impacts the physiological 
aspect of pathology. 
An alternate explanation of this phenomenon may be that 
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definitional constructs of anger as an emotion differ greatly 
from anxiety and depression. It has been documented that 
anxiety and depression as constructs overlap (Mook, et al., 
1990). In addition, there is a stronger relationship between 
anxiety and depression, than there is with anger. Upon 
inspection of the correlation matrix, it is evident that 
anxiety and depression are more correlated (.51 to .58) than 
anger and depression {-.18 to .35), and anger and anxiety 
(-.34 to .44). Overall, it appears that the experience of 
attributional style and anxiety and depression are not 
independent of each other. 
The Impact of Affect on Attributional Style 
Upon examination of how the cognitive variables loaded 
upon the set of the affective variables, it appeared that 
Globality and Stability related significantly to the linear 
composite of the affective variables while Internality did 
not. This phenomenon may be explained in a number of ways. 
Psychometrically, of the three dimensions of attributional 
style, Internality was the weakest construct with the lowest 
reliability (.66). In addition, Internality was fairly 
independent of Globality and Stability, while these two 
dimensions correlate moderately with each other (.59). 
Peterson remarked, internal attributions for negative events 
"are associated with a loss of self esteem, stable 
explanations with long-lasting helplessness deficits, and 
global explanations with pervasive deficits (1988, 
p. 87). Thus, in relation to high levels of anxiety, 
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depression, and anger, a more common cognitive style is one 
more global and pervasive in negative attributions and more 
stable in making the negative attributions, and not 
necessarily low self esteem. If true, this finding 
conflicts with Tennert and Herzberger's (1987) findings that 
low self esteem is more characteristic of individuals with an 
unhealthy attributional style, independent of depression 
status. Though internal versus external attributions are not 
as consistent in the experience of trait anxiety, it seems 
that global and stable attributions are consistent with the 
characterological experience of anxiety. Weiner (1986) 
concluded the causality dimensions of Stability and Globality 
will influence the expectancy of future noncontingency thus 
holding implications for the generality and chronicity of 
helplessness. In relation to trait anxiety, an individual's 
self-esteem may not be associated with a consistent style of 
perceiving events. However, if the individual tends to make 
more global and stable attributions, he/she will tend to 
perceive the world in a consistent and perhaps predictable 
manner. Thus if an individual experiences situations as being 
consistently threatening, there is a strong possibility 
that he/she will be more stable and global in his/her 
attributional style; Other possible explanations of this 
event may be that there is another hidden variable that 
influences both the experience of affect and attributional 
style. That confounding variable could originate from 
several sources such as environmental influences, or 
consequences or rewards of e~pressing affect. These 
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at the center of their theories of depression" (1989, p.108}. 
However, Beck's (1967) cognitive theory of depression did not 
include the concept of anger-expressed inward. His theory 
focused on the distorted thoughts and attitudes that are 
responsible for the feelings of depression. 
The other variables that did not load on the 
attributional set of variables described a different picture 
of affect. These variable.s were trait anger, state anger, 
anger out and anger-control. It seemed that the introduction 
of attributional style separated out anxiety and depression 
from anger. Why did anxiety and depression load on the 
attributional variables while anger did not? Perhaps these 
variables, trait anxiety, state anxiety, depression and anger 
expressed inward, described an internalized process of the 
experience of affect. It could be said that these variables 
constituted emotions that reflect an internalized process. 
These affective variables described an internalized process 
that may influence an individual's style of attributing cause 
to events. These findings would predict that an individual 
who characterologically experiences anxiety, in addition to 
depression, and anger expressed inwards will tend to be more 
. global, internal, and stable in his/her attributions. This ' 
unhealthy and rigid style of attribution is linked to the 
concept of learned helplessness (Peterson,1988}. Seligman, 
Abramson, Semmel and von Baeyer (1979) described individuals 
who habitually provide internal, stable and global 
explanations are believed to have a depressive explanatory 
style that puts them at risk when negative events occur. 
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Therefore, these findings suggested that individuals with 
this type of attributional style may experience trait 
anxiety, depression, state anxiety, and anger turned inward 
more often than individuals who possessed a healthier and 
more flexible attributional style. This finding also 
corroborates the findings of Riskind, Rholes, Brannon, and 
Burdick (1987). These authors found that attributional style 
may predict future levels of depression through a confluence 
hypothesis that suggest indivio.uals with unhealthy 
attributional styles will be more likely to be affected by 
negative outcome expectations thus resulting in depressive 
symptomatology. Therefore, if anxiety and depression are 
often experienced internally, it would seem logical that a 
rigid cognitive style, i.e. global, stable, and internal, 
would correspond to these emotions. The relationship 
between depression and attributional style has been well 
documented, specifically in the learned helplessness research 
(Peterson, 1982); though, the link between anxiety and 
attributional style has not been as well defined. Therefore; 
it seems that a rigid attributional style, one that is 
global, stable, and internal, will correspond more often to 
anxiety and depression that it will to anger. 
It is also interesting to note that a rigid 
attributional style relates more to affect, such as anxiety 
and depression, that is seen as more pathological in 
experience and expression than anger. This is evident by the 
fact that in the DSM III-R (APA, 1987) several pages are 
devoted to affective disorders that are mostly comprised of 
confounding variables may only be ferreted out through 
experimental research that goes beyond this correlational 
study. 
State-Trait Dimension of Affect 
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Upon examining research question two in terms of how 
cognitive style relates to state and trait dimensions of 
affect, the results will be discussed. The fact that several 
measures of trait and state affective dimensions varied 
across three different measures of attributional style allows 
one to examine the state/trait aspect of attributional style. 
It appears that trait anxiety accounted for a major 
proportion of variance across all three dimensions of 
attributional style. This may suggest attributional style 
would likely relate to a state/trait orientation in terms of 
affect. In addition, Globality and Stability also reflect a 
state/trait dimension, in that being more global and stable, 
the more charactological the attributional style will be. 
The global/specific dimensions of causal attributions 
refers to the extent to which an individual believes that the 
cause of helplessness or uncontrollability are generalized 
across many situations or is limited to one or a few specific 
situations. This corresponds to the concept of a state/trait 
dimension. It seems that an individual who responds to a 
wide spectrum of events as threatening, the definition of 
trait anxiety (Spielberger, 1972), will tend to be global and 
stable in his/her attributions of negative events. The logic 
of this relationship validates the learned helplessness 
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model. Therefore, if depression corresponds to a rigid 
attributional style, and depression correlates to anxiety 
(.58), it might be believed that anxiety will related to a 
rigid attributional style. In fact, upon examination of the 
multiple regression summary tables, Trait Anxiety was the 
first step in both the Stability and Globality dimensions of 
Attributional Style, and it was the second step in predicting 
Internality. However, another possible explanation for this 
finding may be the difficulty in separating the concepts of 
depression and anxiety definitionally (Bramley, Easton, 
Morley, & Snaith, 1988, Mook, et al.,1990). Anxiety and 
depression may share a similar cognitive style due to the 
possibility that these two constructs may have considerable 
overlap definitionally. Both constructs share similar 
symptomatology. In fact, some items on the STAI are the same 
as some items on the BDI. It is apparent that further study 
in this area is required to better differentiate between the 
constructs of depression and anxiety. 
Another question arises as to why State Anxiety also 
loaded moderately on the attributional variables. Does this 
indicate that anxiety in general relates to attributional 
style and that state or trait makes no impact? Perhaps to 
respond to this question, it must be remembered that an 
individual who tends to experience more trait anxiety, will 
also experience more heightened levels of state anxiety 
(Spielberger, 1972). 
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Gender Differences, Attributional Style, and Affect 
Do gender differences exist in the experience of affect 
and the style of attribution? According to the results of 
the t-tests, there appeared to be no substantial gender 
differences within the sample. This finding corroborates 
with Fuqua et al. (1993) finding that there are no significant 
differences between males and females in the experience of 
state-trait anger and anxiety, and depression. In addition, 
Peterson and Villanova (1988) found no sex differences in 
terms of attributional style. It is interesting to note that 
individuals tend to report a greater gender difference when 
evaluating themselves as opposed to objective observation 
(Matlin, 1993). Though this study employed self-report 
measures, which would have the potential to inflate the 
gender differences, still non were found. Still there is a 
need for further investigation into the gender issue, affect 
and attributional style. Though men and women do not report 
significant differences in the amount of affect they 
experience, perhaps there is a qualitative difference in 
their expression of affect or the consequences they encounter 
when expressing affect. These issues require further study. 
Clinical Implications 
What are the clinical implications of these findings? 
This unhealthy style of attribution is linked to the concept 
of learned helplessness (Peterson,1988). Seligman, Abramson, 
Semmel and von Baeyer (1979) described individuals who 
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habitually provide internal, stable and global explanations 
are believed to have a depressive explanatory style that puts 
them at risk when negative events occur. This study's 
findings also found that a rigid attributional style would 
indicate anxiety, depression, and anger turned inward. 
Cognitive interventions of depression have been found to be 
effective (Beck, 1979); therefore, perhaps cognitive 
techniques will prove to be beneficial in the treatment of 
anxiety. Several cognitive behavioral therapies are 
implemented in the treatment of stress and anxiety 
(Meichenbaum, Turk, & Burstein, 1975; Belkin, 1979). The 
clinical implications of these findings may suggest that a 
cognitive approach with individuals who experience anxiety on 
a trait level may be effective. It may be advantageous to 
survey the client with the STAI and the EASQ to have a better 
understanding of their state or trait orientation to anxiety 
and their attributional style. This endeavor may save time 
by focusing the treatment on the appropriate interventions 
based on an accurate diagnosis. In addition, an exploration 
of an individual's attributional style may be a signal to a 
clinician of the severity and chronicity of the experience of 
negative affect an individual experiences. This may also be 
helpful in the diagnosis of the experience of affect. 
Exploration in to the development of a state/trait depression 
inventory would benefit the diagnosis and treatment of 
depression. For just as anger and anxiety have proven to be 
multivariate constructs, it appears that the concept of the 
depression is more complex than suspected. Further study is 
91 
needed in this area to confirm these suggestions. 
Limitations of the Study 
Several limitations in this study should be examined in 
order to put the interpretation of the results in 
perspective. 
Sample/Generalizability 
One major limitation is that an undergraduate population 
was employed in this study, therefore, the generalizability 
to other populations, namely clinical, will be limited. The 
generalizability of the study is limited in that a white 
undergraduate student population was utilized. Therefore, no 
comparisons with studies employing other populations 
including clinical, minority, or non college age individuals 
may be made. Another limitation of the study is that all of 
the measurements of affect and attributional style were 
collected while the subjects were at rest; therefore, the 
affective/ cognitive relationship is less likely to operate 
than when emotional arousal is introduced. 
Measurement 
The sole use of self-report measures may be called into 
question. Are self-report measures as valid a measure of 
affect as other experimental measures? In addition, self-
report questionnaires as a measure of outcome may be 
confounded by response sets. The length of the 
questionnaires together may have affected subject retention, 
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and several protocols were not completed, therefore, not as 
many subjects were collected as hoped for. It is interesting 
to note that Matlin (1993) stated that gender differences are 
increased with the use of self-report methods as opposed to 
observation; however, this study found none with the use of 
these methods. 
Correlational/Experimental 
This study was purely a correlational investigation into 
the relationship between attributional style and affect. 
Therefore, specific information is not gleaned from these 
findings for no experimental restrictions were applied. In 
addition, no control groups were used; therefore, no 
assumptions may be made concerning causality. Though a 
relationship did exist between attributional style and 
affect,the causal nature of these findings are not revealed 
in this analysis. The question as to whether attributional 
style causes affect to behave in a particular fashion, or 
vice versa will not be answered from these findings. 
Recommendations for Continuing Research 
There are several recommendations to take into 
consideration when replicating this study in order to 
strengthen the study. First of all, a clinical population 
should be employed in addition to a non-clinical population. 
Perhaps a cross section of individuals with anxiety, 
depressive, and conduct (anger) disorders should be utilized 
in the study in order to expand the generalizability to 
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clinical populations. Also, other non-student populations 
should be employed in order to better understand the aspects 
of the adult developmental experience of affect and 
attributional style. In addition, comparisons should be made 
between subjects at rest and subjects in a states of anger, 
anxiety, and depression. Perhaps while the subjects are 
completing the questionnaires, a confederate will act out 
scenarios to induce specific affective reactions among the 
subjects. It may also be useful to employ other outcome 
measures than self-report questionnaires to avoid 
confounding of response sets. Perhaps more physiological 
measures, such as galvanic skin response, heart rate, or 
blood pressure levels, may be employed in conjunction with 
the self-report measures to better investigate the experience 
of affect. In addition, it would be fascinating to develop a 
state/trait depression inventory to utilize in this area of 
research. With the use of several state/trait measures and 
attributional measures, it would be interesting to see how 
the concept of state/trait depression would fit into this 
puzzle of the relationship between attributional style and 
affect. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Issues concerning the relationship of attributional 
style and affect have been explored extensively with regards 
to depression. However, there are few studies that examine 
the relationship of attributional style to anger and anxiety, 
especially with regards to the state-trait aspects. This 
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study was designed to understand the relationship between the 
dimensions of attributional style (Globality, Stability, and 
internality) and affect (Anger, Anxiety and Depression). A 
sample of 300 undergraduate students were administered an 
attributional style questionnaire along with several 
affective scales. The statistical analysis included a 
canonical correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis, 
and t-tests to examine the relationship among these 
dimensions. Trait anxiety, state anxiety, depression, and 
anger expressed inward were found to relate the most to 
attributional style. It seemed that attributional style may 
separate out the experience of anger from anxiety and 
depression. It was concluded that trait anxiety correlates 
with a rigid and negative attributional style.In addition, 
Globality and Stability were found to relate to affect, thus 
there may be a state/trait dimension to attributional style. 
No gender differences were found in the sample, and this 
finding supports earlier research in the field. The applied 
clinical implications were discussed, and it was proposed 
that a cognitive approach focusing on changing an 
individual's attribution style may be beneficial. 
Based on this study's findings, it appears that affect 
and attributional style are important components that 
constitute the way individuals experience and perceive the 
world through thought and feelings. Further research into 
this area of interest, based on the recommendations of this 
study, may shed more light on to the complex realm of affect 
and attributional style. 
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Table 1 
Structure coefficients 
Variable 
Affective 
Depression 
Trait-Anxiety 
State-Anxiety 
Trait-Anger 
State-Anger 
Anger-In 
Anger-Out 
Anger-Control 
Cognitive 
Globality 
Stability 
Internality 
Structure 
Coefficients 
-.63318 
-.96570 
-.64863 
-.39636 
-.34931 
-.60655 
-.18992 
.20834 
-.81497 
-.93239 
-.20229 
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Table 2 
Multiple Regression Summ9 ry T9bles Predicting E§ch 
Attribution Variable by the Affective Variables 
Variable: Globality 
Step VariableMultR Rsq F(eqn) SigF Rsqch SigCh Betain 
1 Tr-Anx .3036 .0922 25.579 .000 .0922 .000 .3036 
2 Ang-Con .3100 . 0961 13.342 .000 .0039 .296 .0668 
3 Ang-In .3130 .0979 9.048 .000 .0018 .475 .0494 
4 Dep. .3145 .0989 6. 833. 000 .0010 .605 .0386 
5 Tr-Ang .3154 .0995 5.478 .000 .0005 .698 .0291 
6 St-Anx .3158 .0997 4.561.000 .0003 .780 .0258 
7 Ang-Out .3159 .0998 3.895 .000 .0000 .925 . 0072 
8 St-Anger.3159 .0998 3.395 .001 .0000 .962 .0037 
Variable: Internality 
Step VariableMultR Rsq F (eqn) SigF Rsqch SigCh Betain 
1 St-Anger.1383 .0191 4.915 .028 .0191 .028 -.1383 
2 Tr-Anx .2157 .0465 6.125 .003 .0274 .008 .1807 
3 Ang-In .2388 .0570 5.038 .002 .0105 .097 - .1166 
4 Ang-Con .2444 .0597 3.953 .007 .0020 .399 -.0570 
5 Dep. .2484 . 0617 3.263 .012 .0015 .466 .0558 
6 St-Anx .2514 .0632 2.779 .012 .0015 .530 .0656 
7 Ang-Out .2524 .0637 2.390 .022 .0005 . 729 -.0255 
8 Tr-Ang .2530 .0640 2.094 .037 .0003 .775 .0245 
115 
Correl 
.3036 
-.0439 
.1861 
.2076 
.1266 
.2386 
.0738 
.1454 
Correl 
-.1383 
.0961 
-.0809 
-.1026 
.0686 
. 0479 
-.0062 
. 0114 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Variable: Stability 
Step Variable MultR Rsq F(eqn) SigF Rsqch SigCh Betain Correl 
1 Tr-Anx .3343 .11.18 31. 713 .000 .1118 .000 .3343 .3343 
2 Ang-In .3477 .1209 17.259 .000 .0091 .108 .1067 .2344 
3 St-Anx .3538 .1252 11. 925 .000 .0043 .269 -.0983 .2053 
4 Ang-Out .3551 .1261 8.982 .000 .0009 . 611 -.0313 .0607 
5 Dep. .3558 .1266 7.191 .000 .0005 .701 .0287 .2130 
6 Tr-Ang .3559 .1267 5. 971 .000 .0001 .896 .0100 .1402 
7 Ang-Con .3560 .1268 5.101 .000 .0001 .888 .0109 -.0733 
8 St-Ang .3560 .1268 4.446 .000 .0000 .958 .0042 .1249 
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Table 3 
Intercorrelation Matrix Among Variables 
STATE-ANX TR-ANX ST-ANGER TR-ANGER ANG-IN ANG-OUT 
STATE-ANXIETY 1. 00 
TRAIT-ANXIETY .75 1. 00 
STATE-ANGER .56 .40 1. 00 
TRAIT-ANGER .25 .39 .36 1.00 
ANGER-IN .33 .44 .34 .29 1. 00 
ANGER-OUT .21 . 26 .27 .55 .16 1.00 
ANGER-CON -.26 -.34 -.14 -.49 .05 -.48 
DEPRESSION .51 .58 .30 .32 .35 .21 
GLOBAL I TY .24 .30 .14 .13 .19 .07 
INTERNAL I TY .05 .10 -.14 .01 -.08 -.01 
STABILITY .20 33 .12 .14 .23 .06 
ANG-CON DEPRESS GLOBAL INTERNAL STABILITY 
ANGER-CON 1. 00 
DEPRESSION -.18 1. 00 
GLOBAL I TY -.04 .21 1. 00 
INTERNAL I TY -.10 .07 .04 1.00 
STABILITY -.07 .21 .57 .12 1.00 
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Table 4 
T-Tests Between Males and Females 
Variable Mean Std. Dev F value 2-Tail Prob. 
Anger-Out 
Female 16.24 4.49 1. 27 .146 
Male 16.83 3.98 
Anger-Control 
Female 22.36 5.4 1. 00 1. 00 
Male 23.43 5.4 
Anger-Ex~ression 
Female 2 6. 91 9.77 1. 07 . 670 
Male 2 6. 56 9.43 
De~ression 
Female 9.43 8.19 1. 09 .586 
Male 7.95 8.56 
Globaliti 
Female 3.97 1. 01 1. 28 .157 
Male 3.77 .896 
Stabilit:;L 
Female 4.32 .76 1. 04 .804 
Male 4.29 .77 
Internaliti 
Female 4.54 .67 1. 00 .99 
Male 4.45 .67 
State-Anxieti 
Female 40.03 12.29 1. 15 .39 
Male 36.87 11.45 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Variable M.e..an Std. Dev F Value 2-Tail Prob. 
Trait-An~iet;t 
Female 41. 41 11. 23 1. 26 .19 
Male 38.91 10.03 
State-Ange:i:: 
Female 12.75 5.54 1.23 .21 
Male 12.90 5.0 
Ira it-Anger 
Female 20.37 6.16 1.12 .50 
Male 20.04 5.83 
Trait-Anger, Temperament 
Female 7.15 3.0 1.13 .46 
Male 6.93 2.83 
Trait-Anger, Rea!:;tion 
Female 9.66 2.9 1.12 .51 
Male 9.29 2.75 
Anger-In 
Female 17.03 4.50 1.07 .70 
Male 17.16 4.36 
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